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Where Credit Is Due: Advantages of
the Credit-Invoice Method for a
Partial Replacement VAT
ITAI GRINBERG'
L

TN'I' HODUCTI ON

The value-added tax ("VAT") is a mainstay of fiscal systems in over
130 countries around the wo rld, includ ing every O rgan isation for Eco-

nomic Cooperation and Development ("GECD") coun try except the
U nited States. l Although the re are two major alternat ive methods for
calculating VAT liability-the "credit-invoice method" and the "subtraction method"-existing nationa l-leve l VAT s are implemented almost excl usively using th e credit- invoice met hod.2 Japa n is the o nly

developed economy that utilizes some subtraction-meth od fea tures to
impose a VAT.3
Numero us prio r papers have analyzed credit-i nvoice method and
subt raction-method VATs. This Arl icle draws on th aI literature 10 focus o n some of the simi laril ies and d ifferences between these two
methods fo r ca lculating VAT li abi lity. In the United States, some
prominent tax refo rm pro posals have involved variants o f the s ubt raction-met hod VAT that are intended to make the tax more progressive
and potentia ll y more appropriate as a replacemenl for the entire income tax. 4 By contrast, this A rticle focuses o n questions that would
• AttorneY-Advisor, Or£ice of Tax Policy. U.S. Treasury Department. The views
expressed here are my own and are not intended in any way to represe nt the views o f the
U.S. Treasury Department. I would like to thank Reuven Avi-Yonah, Jesse Eggert,
Michael Graetz, Charles McLure, Jr., Michael Plowgian, and Emil Sun ley for generously
laking Ihe time 10 read and comment on earlier drafts of this paper. Any errors or
omissions are my own.
I See Jeffrey Owens, Fundamental Tax Refo rm: An Inte rnational Perspective, 59 Nat'!
Tax J. 131 (2006) (providing detailed discussion of revenue sources in DECO countries).
2 A third method for calculating VAT liability, the Haddition method," has never been
adopted as a national tax in any jurisdiction. See nOte 117 and accompanying text.
3 See notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
4 Various consumption tax proposa ls have received attention in academic and political
ci rcles, In addi tion to credi t-invoice method and subtractio n-method VATs, among the
most well-known proposals are the Flat Tax, popularized by preside ntial candida te Steve
Forbes, and the X-Tax, a progressive rate variation developed by the la te David Bradford
that uses the same structure as the Flat Tax. Sec David Bradford, Fundamental Issues in
Consumption Taxation (1996); David F. Bradford, 1be X-Tu in the World Economy
(NBER. Working Paper No. WI0676, 2004), available at htlp:/lwww.nber.orglpapersl
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arise if an unmodified subtraction·method VAT or a credit~invoice
method VAT were chosen to supplement or replace some portion of
the revenue from the income tax.
Part I describes the basic mechanics of a credit-invoice method
VAT and a subtraction-method VAT. Credit-invoice method VATs
calculate VAT due by multiplying the value of taxable sa les by the
relevant tax rate and subtracting VAT paid on inputs from the tentative tax due on sales. Subtraction-method VATs subtract the amount
paid for inputs from taxable sales and multiply by the relevant tax
rate. The key perceived difference between the credit-invoice method
VAT and the subtraction-method VAT is that the former is generally
conceived as a tax on specific transactions, whereas the latter is generally thought to be a tax on an entity. The key substantive difference
between most subtraction-method VAT proposals and extant creditinvoice method VATs is that subtraction-method VAT proposals generally do not impose an invoice requirement. An invoice requirement
achieves two ends: It limits the VAT credits provided for tax paid
with respect to inputs purchased by entities subject to the VAT ("registe red traders") to purchases from other registe red traders, and il ensures that the VAT credit obtained by the purchaser is equal to the
VAT paid on the input. Borrowing from Charles McLure and David
Weisbach's work and nomenclature, Part II categorizes subtractionmet hod VATs that provide registered traders a deduction for all input
purchases as " open" subtraction-method VATs, and subtractionmethod VATs that would strictly limit deductions to purchases from
other registered traders as "sophisticated" subtraction-method VATs.
Most well-known U.S. subtraction-method VAT proposals are not sophisticated subtraction-method VATs.
Part III considers how choosing the credit-invoice method VAT, the
open subtraction-method VAT, or the sophisticated subtractionmethod VAT may affect VAT administration and design and, conversely, how choices regarding desired administrative and design features may dictate which method is preferable . These design features
include whether to exempt certain supplies of goods or services by
certain entities from the VAT, whether to tax supplies of some goods
or services at lower rates, the taxation of nonprofit organizations,
Slate and local government, real estate, financial services, and small
w10676.pdf (he reinafter X-Tax]; Robert E. Hall & Alvin Rabushka. The Flat Tax (2d ed.
1995). The Flat Tax and the X·Tax both modify a "subuaction-method" VAT in order to
collect the portion of val ue added to a product anributable to labor at the individual level.
Using a graduated ra te structure to ta x value added attributable to labor makes the distribution of the burden of a VAT more progressive. Although extensively discussed in the
U.S. fund amen tal lax reform debate, such modified subtraction-method VAT proposals
generally are beyond the scope of Ihis Article.
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business, and, importantly. how to treat imports, exports, and " Josses"
(nega tive taxable value-added). Part III identifies VAT best practices
for each design feature and evaluates the capacity of a VAT to adopt
those best practices with or without an invoice requirement, as well as
the potential effect of using a credit-invoice or subtraction-method approach. Many of the relevant design issues 3re specifically addressed
in other Articles for this conference. Where those Arti cles offer specific design recommendations based on the literature and international experience, Part II] trea ts those recommendations as best
practice.
Part III illustrates that the Jack of symmetry between deductions
and inclusions in an open subtraction-method VAT leaves such a system susceptible 10 significant tax avoidance. That same asymmetry
also invites lobbying for inappro priate exemptions by providers of
specific inte rmediate inputs to othe r businesses. In contrast, neither a
sophisticated subtraction-method VAT nor a credit-invoice method
VAT raise this and ot her concerns that result from a lack of symmetry
between deductions and inclusions. The literature suggests that the
perception of a subtraction-method VAT as an "entity-based " tax,
however, may make exemptions of specific goods and services less
likely than in a cred it-invoice method VAT, and for the same reason
may make entity-based exemptions more likely than in a credi t-invoice method VAT. The recommendations provided by oth er authors
at this conference with respect to the appropriate treatment of se rvices provided by nonprofit organi zations and state and local government, residential housing, and financial services suggest that in these
areas narrowly tailored exemptions and zero-rating can be appropriate, while broad-based entity-level exemptions are less desirable. A
credit-invoice method VAT thus may be preferable to a subtraction method VAT, as it seems better suited to appropriately address these
Issues.
Part III also observes that a credit-invoice method VAT could easily
interact wi th othe r consumption tax systems around the world
and comply with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules without sacrificing VAT design features that allow for effective enforcemen t. In
contrast, following the standard neutrality and enforcement-e nabling
practice of destination-basis taxation (as o pposed to origin-basis taxation) with respect to imports and exports could raise WTO complications in a subtraction-method VAT. Further, the taxation of crossborder services may also be more easi ly coordinated with othe r VAT
systems around the world unde r a credit-invoice met hod VAT than
under a subtraction-method VAT. A credit-in voice method VAT
would also provide more scope for coordination with state-leve l retail
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sales taxes than a subtraction-method VAT. Finally. political economy
concerns may suggest that consumption tax best practices are more
sustainable in a credit-invoice VAT than in a subtraction-method VAT
intended to partially replace or supplement the corporate and individual income taxes.
Part IV considers the implications of David Weisbach 's demonstration that purported substantive differences between the subtractionmethod VAT and the credit-invoice method VAT are not inherent to
the two methods of calculation. Weisbach's analysis shows that a sophisticated subtraction-method VAT that went further and adopted a
full invoice requirement in principle could import all potential features of a credit-invoice method VAT, including multiple rates. Part
IV concludes that while plausible in principle, there is little impetus
for adopting such a tax, at least outside the context of progressive consumption taxes. A subtraction-method VAT with a full invoice requirement and multiple rates would lack the simplicity and familiarity
that advocates of subtraction-method VATs point to when recommending the subtraction-method VAT. The Article concludes that if a
partial replacement VAT were to be adopted by the United States, it
would likely be best-implemented through the credit-invoice method.
The open subtraction-method VAT faces revenue leaks and has significant problems of administration and enforcement. Extant U.S. subtraction-method VAT proposals are generally at least partially open
subtraction-method VATs. While a sophisticated subtraction-method
VAT might not be flawed in the same ways as an open subtractionmethod VAT, VAT design best practices are more readily adopted in
the context of a credit-invoice method VAT.
II.

OVEHVlEW OF VALUE-ADDED TAXES

A variety of structures can be used to tax the value of goods and
services consumed by taxpayers. Tn the United States, the most familiar consumption tax is the retail sales tax ("RST") used by most of the
states. A conceptually pure RST would be imposed whenever a
household purchased any good or service for the purpose of consumption. "Real -world" RSTs, however, most often are imposed on a relatively narrow group of goods and services and are prone to evasion. s
RSTs also tend to "cascade," which is to say that some goods are
double-taxed because businesses pay RST on goods or services they
S For discussions of tbe narrOwness of RST bases and their susceptibility to evasion, see
Charles E. McLure, Jr., The U.S. Debate on Consumption-Based Taxes: Implications for
the Americas, 29 U. Miami Inter-A m. L. Rev. 143, 148-49 (1997); John L. Mikesell, A
Quality Index for State Sales Tax Structure-Measuring the States Against an Ideal Standard, 35 SI. Tax Notes 129 (Jan. 10, 2005).
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purchase as inputs for their business processes, and the n those inputs
are taxed a second time as part of the sale of the final good or service.6
The VAT is conceptually similar to an RST, but is imposed vi a a
mechanism that involves every stage of production and distribution.
Relative to an RST, most analysts conclude that a VAT reduces evasion , improves enforcement, is more likely to be imposed on a broader
tax base, and systematically avoids the "cascading" problem.1
A.

Credit-Invoice Melhod VAT

In a credit-invoice method VAT, registered businesses ("registered
traders") assess tax on taxable goods and se rvices each time they supply such a good or service to either a business or a consumer.8 Registered traders then are permitted to reduce the amount of VAT they
are liable to remit to the government by a credit equal to the amount
of VAT paid to other registered traders in purchasing business inputs
(intermediate goods, services, fuel, plant and equipment, and the
Like). The credit eliminates the VAT on goods and services used by a
registered trader, but leaves in place the VAT on sales to final consumers.9 This mechanism ensures that the consumption of all goods
and services subject to the VAT will be taxed once, but only once,
generally at the consumer leve l.
The amount of VAT credit available to a registered trader to offset
VAT liability is determined based on printed invoices received by a
purchasing registered trader from a selling registered trader (referred
to herein as the " invoice requirement "). These invoices detail the
amount of VAT collected on a given sale, and the VAT registration
numbers of the buyer and seller. The invoice requirement makes the
VAT partially self-policing because registe red traders demand invoices in order to claim the input credits that reduce their own VAT
liability. While the claim that the VAT is self-enforcing may be over6 See, e.g., Robert Cline, John L. Mikesell, Thomas S. Ne ubig & Andrew Phillips, Sales
TaxaliOIl of Business Inputs: Existillg Tax DislOrtiolls and the Consequences of Extending
the Sales Tax to Business Services, 35 St. Tax Notes 457, 465·66 (Feb. 14,2005).
7 See, e.g., Sijbre n Cnossen, Evaluating the National Retail Sales Tax from a VAT Per·
spective, in United Slates Tax Reform in the 21st Century 215 (George R. Zodrow & Peter
Mieszkowski cds., 2002); John L. Mikesell, The American Retail Sales Tax: Considerations
on Their Structure, Operations, and Potential as a Foundation for a Federal Sales Tax, 50
Nat'l Tax J. 149 (1997); George K. Yin. DUnwody Distinguished lecture in l aw, Is the Tax
System Beyond Reform?, 58 Fla. l. Rev. 977, 1006-11 (2006); George R. Zodrow, The
Sa les Tax, the VAT, and Taxes in Between-or, Is the Only Good NRST a "VAT in
Drag"?, 52 Nat'l Tax J. 429 (1999).
8 Although some VAT regimes recognize a legal distinction between the te rms "sale"
and "supply," they are used interchangeably in th is Article.
9 See Cnossen, note 7, at 215-17; Mikesell, note 7, at 151-52; Yin, note 7, at 1006·10;
Zodrow, note 7, at 43\.
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Slaled, when subsequently used to claim an input credit, VAT invoices
create a paper trail that gives tax authorities an independent source of
information about the selling firm's sales, and thus can belp the tax
authorities enforce the VAT. The prospect of this type of third-party
information reporting may induce businesses to comply more fully
with the law. The VAT invoice chain also may provide a useful tool in
the enforcement of business income taxes.
After applying input credits, a registered trader's final VAT liability
is equivalent to a tax on the " value added" by that business- defined
as the sales price of the outputs of the business less the purchase price
of its nonlabor inputs previously subject to VAT. In a well ~ function
ing VAT, a registered trader with more input credits than VAT liability (for example, an exporter or a firm that makes a large capital
investment) can obtain a refund for VAT paid in excess of input
credits.
The following example illustrates how the credit-invoice method
VAT collects the same amount of tax as an ideal RST. A winemaker
buys grapes from a grape grower and uses them to produce a case of
wine for sale to retailers. The winemaker buys grapes and other supplies from the grape grower at a cost of $30 per case of wine before
tax . The winemaker sells each case of wine for $70 before tax. The
retailer sells a case of wine for $100 before lax. In an ideal RST, only
the sale by the retailer to consumers would be taxed. If the RST rate
were 20% , $20 of tax would be collected by the retailer on the sale of
a $100 case of wine to a final consumer and remitted to the
government. 10
A 20% VAT added to each transaction in the production and distri bution process collects the same amount of re venue as a noncascading
RST (charged only to final consumers). Because the VAT is charged
on all sa les of taxable goods and se rvices ("taxable supplies"), the
grape grower collects 20% VAT on her sa les of grapes, charging the
winemaker $6 of tax on each $30 of sales. The grape grower remits
the $6 of VAT to the government. The winemaker charges the retailer
$84 ($70 + $14 of VAT) per case of win e. Instead of sending all $14 of
VAT to the government, however, the winemaker subtracts the $6 of
VAT paid by the winemaker to the grape grower from the $14 collected in VAT, and remits $8 to the government per case of wine sold.
Similarly, instead of remitting $20 per case of wine sold to the government , the retailer subtracts the $14 of VAT paid by the retailer to the
winemaker from the $20 collected in VAT from the consumer, and
10 RSTs tend 10 cascade, and thereby deviate from Ihe ideal, because the law does nOI
always distinguish between, for eumple. sales of wine to an individual for personal consumption and sales of wine to a restauran t for resale.
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remits $6 to the government per case of wine sold. The tax authority
receives $20 in total-$6 from the grape grower, $8 from the
winemaker, and $6 from the retailer. The VAT and the RST collect
equivalent amounts of revenue, and from the consumer's perspective
the taxes look identical. l ]

EXA.MPLE I

Grape
Grower

Winemaker

Retailer

Total

$30
0
30

$70
30
40

$100
70
30

$100

6

14

0

6
8

20
14

Basic Transactions

Pretax sales
Pretax purchases
Value added (sales · purchases)
Credit-Invoice Method VAT
Tax on sales (20% of line 1)
Less: input tax on purchases
Net VAT liability
Rerail Sales Tax
Tax on sales (20% of line 1)

6
Exempt

Exempt

6

20

$ 20

$ 20

Credit-invoice method VAT liability generally is calculated from accounts for a taxable period (generally monthly, bimonthly, or quarterly). Aggregate input tax paid is subtracted from aggregate tax
liability on all taxable sales for the taxable period. Notwithstanding
the fact that the credit-invoice method VAT is often referred to as a
"transaction-based" tax (because conceptually the tax is assessed on
each individual transaction subject to the VAT), VAT liability and
VAT credits are not matched for each individual item sold. A more
precise description is that the credit-invoice method VAT is a "transactions-based, accounts-verified" tax, because while the tax is assessed
on each individual transaction, tax remittance to the tax authority is
calculated and audited based on accounts. 12
11 like an RST, consumers can be shown credit-invoice method VAT liability for their
purchases on printed receipts, Ihereby making the tax "visible." See, e.g., Repon of the
President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, Simple, Fair & Pro·Growth: Proposals
to Fix America's Tal[ System 204 (Nov. 2005) [hereinafter Tax Reform Panel Report),
available at http://permanenl.access.gpo.gov/lps64969rraI[Reformwholedoc. pdf. Stating
Ihe VAT separately is nOI only possible, but also more consistent with the invoice
requirement.
12 See Sijbren Cnossen, VAT Coordination in Common Markets and Federations: lessons from the European El[perience, 63 Tal[ L. Rev. 583 (2010). An audilor, for example,
may request invoices 10 suppon particular input credits, and cross-check a sample of those
invoices.
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Subtraction-Method VAT

The general design features of a subtraction-method VAT-sometimes referred to as a "business transfer tax"-are somewhat less well
specified than those of a credit-invoice method VAT. This is largely
because few taxes characterized as subtraction-method VATs have existed in practice. Analysts, however, consistently distinguish a subtraction-method VAT from a credit-method VAT by noting that a
subtraction-method VAT does not use credits and that tax due is not
calculated by subtracting tax paid from gross tax liability.J3 Instead,
registered traders subtract the value of their total nonlabor inputs
from the total value of their sales and then multiply by the VAT rate
to determine their tax liability.14 As a result , the subtraction method
is described as being "accounts-based," rather than "transactionsbased," ls and is commonly perceived to be a tax on an entity.16 In
contrast, the credit-invoice method tax is commonly understood to be
a tax on specific goods and services. 17
13 Although there is almost uniform agreement on this point, many analysts also describe the Japanese VAT as a sUbtraction-method tax. See, e.g., Bruce BartleH, Support
the VAT, Oct. 23, 2009, available at http:/{forbes.comJ2009Il0J22frepublicans-value-addedtax-opinions-columnists-bruce-bartlell .hlml; Paul L.E. Grieco & Gary C. Hufbauer,
America Badly Needs a Value-Added Tax, Fin. limes, Apr. 21, 2005, al 15. Alan Schenk
and Oliver Oldman more accurately describe the Japanese VAT as a "credit-subtraction"
VAT, as opposed to Ihe "sales-subtraction VAT" discussed in Ihis Article. See Alan
Schenk & Oliver Oldman, Value-added Tax: A Comparative Approach 42 (2007). Under
the Japanese VAT, gross tax on taxable sales is calculated in the same way as in the creditinvoice method VAT. The mOSI important "subtraction" feature of the Japanese VAT is
that taxpayers are allowed 10 subtract from their VAT liability an amount of input credit
that is calculated from aggregate accounts, based on total purchases from domestic entities,
instead of subtracting the amounl of tax paid on each individual transaction with a regislered trader, as shown on credit·invoice method VAT invoices. The Japanese have gradu·
ally reformed their VAT since it was first imposed, and Ihe reforms have adopted
enforcement features that make the tax more akin to a credit·invoice method VAT. For
more on the Japanese consumption tax, see nOles 134-37, and accompanying text; see also
Schenk & Oldman, supra, at 67-69; Alan Schenk, Japanese Consumption Tax After Si)(
Years: A Unique VAT Matures, 69 Tax Notes 899 (Nov. 13, 1995).
\4 Schenk and Oldman describe this method of VAT calculation more precisely as a
"sales-subtraclion method," to distinguish il from Ihe Japanese VAT. Schenk & Oldman,
note 13, at 42.
IS ViCioria P. Summers, The Border Adjustability of Consumption Taxes, Existing and
Proposed, 12 Tax Notes Int'l 1793, 1796 (June 3, 1996). David Weisbach points outlhat,
like subtraclion-method VATs, credit-invoice method VATs aggregate Iransactions over
some period into a single return, so that both forms of VAT are based on transactions and
bolh are periodic. David A. Weisbach, Fundamenlal Tax Reform: Does the X-Tax Mark
the Spot?, 56 SMU L Rev. 201, 215 (2003). While this observation is correct, it is equally
nue that sales ta)(es imposed by the U.S. states are aggregated into a Single return and
imposed periodically. Nevertheless, sales taxes are perceived as taxes on specific
transactions.
16 See Liam Ebrill, Michael Keen , Jean-Paul Bodin & Victoria Summers, The Modern
VAT 21 (2001).
17 Id.; Grieco & Hufbauer, note 13, at 15:
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Michael Graetz observes that , to its proponents, " a subtractionmethod VAT ... has the political virtue of looking more like a corporate income tax , and it does not show up as a separate charge to consumers."18 One consequence is that U.S. subtraction-method VAT
proposa ls, in contrast to credit-invoice method VAT proposals, generally are proposed to fully replace the corporate income tax,I 9 In addition to viewing the subtraction method as the simplest way to
calculate VAT liability, proponents choose the subtraction-method
VAT because they believe it "demonstrate[s] that the tax is a business
tax," is more familiar to U.S. businesses, avoids complicating the administration of state and local sa les taxes, and is less prone to imposition at multiple rates on different goods. 20
Credit-invoice method VAT rates, like sales tax rates, are generally
thought of on a tax-exclusive basis. In contrast, because a subtractionmethod VAT is perceived to be a tax on an entity, subtraction-method
VAT rates, like income tax rates, are generally thought of on a taxinclusive basis. [f a good costs $100 and bears an additional $20 of tax ,
the tax-exclusive rate is 20%. The tax inclusive-rate is 16.6%: $20
(the tax paid) divided by $120 (the total amount of receipts on taxable
sales). Tax-exclusive and tax-inclusive rates are both appropriate
ways of thinking about tax rates. For ease of comparison, however,
this Article generally uses tax-excl usive rates, whether discussing
credit-invoice method VATs or subtraction-method VATs.
Example 2 illustrates how a subtraction-method VAT is calculated,
using the sa me facts as in Example 1, with each registered trader subtracting the value of its pretax nonlabor inputs from the total value of
its pretax sales, and applying a flat 20% tax rate to the difference. As
in Example 1, Example 2 assumes that the grape grower, the
winemaker, and the retailer are all registered traders.
The credit-invoice method used in Europe assesses VAT on each transaction,
but allows a credit for VAT paid by companies on their purchase of intermedi·
ate goods. This requires a chain of invoices a nd results in a system that looks
similar to a sales or turnover tax. Unde r the subtraction met hod, used in Japan, companies pay VAT o n their value added. calculated as the difference
between final sales a nd purchases of intermediate goods. Ad ministratively.
this syste m closely resembles the corporate income tax~and is beller suited to
the U.S.
L8 Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Simple, Fair, and Competitive Tax Plan for the United States 78 (2008).
19 Set: no te 33. Complications that result from repealing the corporate income tax while
retaining the individ ual income tax, such as the incentives fo r individuals to accumulate
passive inves tme nt income in the corporate form to defer or avoid paying individual investor-level taxes on such income, are beyond the scope of this Article.
20 Gary Clyde Hulbauer & Pa ul L.E. Grieco. Reforming The US Corporate Tax 70-7 1
(2005); Eight Memorandums on Provisions in the Danforth/Borcn "Comprehe nsive Tax
Restructuring and Simplification Act of 1994," (May 26, 1994), 94 TNT 103-27, May 27,
1994 , available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File.
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EXM1PLE 2

Grape
Grower

Winemaker

Retailer

Total

$30
0
30

$70
30
40

$\00
70
30

$UlO

6

8

6

20

Basic Transactions
Pretax sales
Pretax purchases
Value added (sales

+

purchases)

Subtraction-Method VAT
VAT liability (20% of line 3)

In this exampLe, the subtraction-method VAT collects the same revenue as the credit-invoice method VAT-in total and at each stage in
the production-distribution process. This result makes sense conceptually. In principle, the credit-invoice method and subtractionmethod VAT are nearly identical taxes. Both are multistage consumption taxes applied on all businesses whether they sell goods to 'the consumer (final point of sale) or to other businesses (intermediate stages
of production and distribution), but with a credit or deduction to offset the tax burden imposed on an intermediate stage producer or distributor. 21 Conceptually either a credit or a deduction can provide an
equivalent offset against taxes due for taxes paid. The tax value of
subtracting purchased inputs from the tax base is arithmetically identical to a credit for all previous VAT paid, assuming VAT is paid at the
same tax rate on all those inputs.
The interchangeability of credits and deductions led David Weisbach to posit that any perceived differences between credit-invoice
method and subtraction-method VATs-such as the availability of deductions for the cost of inputs purchased from nonregistered traders
in the subtraction-method or the credit-invoice method 's flexibility to
impose preferential tax rates on specific goods or services-are based
on the amount of information that analysts assume will be collected
and used to administer credit-invoice method and subtraction-method
VAT systems, respectively, rather than being inherent in the method
of calculation.22 Instead of classifying VATs as credit-invoice method
VATs or subtraction-method VATs, Weisbach divides VATs into three
categories based on the amount of information the seller of an input
provides to the buyer of an input andlor the tax administration.23 The
first category, described by Charles McLure as a " narve" VAT,24 and
21 See Jack. M. Mintz, The Business Transfer Tax as a Consumption Tax, 10 Tax NOles
Int'l 75, 75 (Jan. 2, 1995).
n Weisbach, note 15, at 203.
23 Id. al 214-15.
24 Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Value-Added Tax: Key 10 Deficit Reduction? 71-79
(\987).
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later by Weisbach as an " ope n system ,"2S allows buyers to deduct the
cost of inputs regardless of whether a registe red trader supplies them
and therefore collects VAT on the supply.2(i This Article refers to sub~
traction-method VATs of this type as "open subtraction-method
VATs." The second category Weisbach describes is a "closed " tax that
collects and uses information about whether a supplier of an input is
or is not a registered trade rP McLure has labeled a subtractionmethod VAT that would limit buyers to deductions for the costs of
inputs supplied by registered traders as a "sophisticated " subtraction method VAT.28 This Article uses that term. Finally, Weisbach describes a third category of VAT that collects not o nly the information
to verify whether a supplier is a registered trader, but also information
about the exact amount of tax paid by the supplier with respect to the
sale of the input , for example, the tax detail for each transaction.29
Standard credit-invoice method VATs fall into Weisbach's thi rd category because of their invoice requirement.
C.

The Lack of un Invoice Requirement ill
Subtractioll-Method VAT Proposals

The key substantive difference between subtraction-method VAT
pro posals and extant credit-invoice method VATs is th at the former
generally do not impose an invoice require ment. 3o Many analysts
view the lack of an invoice requirement, and even the lack of verification as to whether a supplier is a registe red trader, as essential characteristics of a s ubtraction-method VAT.31 The lack of an invoice
requirement may seem natural because a subtraction-me thod VAT
subtracts the cost of inputs, so that VAT paid may not see m relevant
to the determination of tax liability. The lack of an invoice requirement is a feature of most subtraction-method type VATs proposed for
the United States. 32
25 David A. Weisbach, Ironing out the Flat Tax, 52 Stan . L. Rev. 599, 613-14 (2000).
26 Weisbach, note 15, a t 21 4-15,
21 Id. at 215 (describing the substantive difference between a credit-invoice method
VAT a nd a sophisticated subtraction-method VAT 10 be that under the credit-invoice
method, a seller must record Ihe amount of tax paid, rat her than simply certi fying whether
the transaction is subject to lax); see McLure, note 24, at 79.
M McLure, note 24, at 71, 76.
Z9 Weisbach. nOle 15, al 215.
3D Weisbach, note 25, at 6ll.
31 Sce, e.g., Gen. Accounting Office, Tax-Credit and Subtraction Methods of Calcu lati ng
a Value-Added Tax, GAO/GGO-89-87, at 13 (1989), available at http://archive.gao.govf
d25t7/138940.pdf (describing the absence of an invoice requirement as the essential characteristic of a subtraction-method VAT).
32 See McLure, note 24, at 71, 78·79; Alan Sche nk, Value Added Tax: A Model Statute
and Commentary, A Report of the Committee o n Value Added Tax of the American Bar
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For example, perhaps the best~known pure subtraction-method
VAT proposals introduced in the U.S. Congress are Senators Boren
and Danforth 's Comprehensive Tax Restructuring and Simplification
Act of 1994,33 and Congressman Sam Gibbons' Revenue Restructuring Act of 1996.l4 Those subtraction -method VAT proposals did not
impose an invoice requirement. 35 Other well-known consumption tax
proposals in the United States (for example, the Flat Tax popularized
by Steve Forbes36 ) utilize a modified subtraction-method VAT structure to impose the VAT at progressive rates. Although these tax
structures are generally beyond the scope of this Article, it should be
noted that these proposals also generally do not include an invoice
requirement.37
The Japanese VAT, which uses some subtraction-method and some
credit-method features in its method of calculation,38 does not incorporate an invoice requirement, but does limit the deductions available
to registered traders when calculating VAT liability to those purchases
made from other domestic entities. 39 Somewhat simjlarly, the Gibbons proposal imposed a tax on the amount by which the gross receipts of a taxable person from business activities exceeded the
Association Section of Taxa tion 3-4 (1989). One notable exception is the progressive subtraction-method tax proposed by the 2005 Tax Reform Panel. Their report provided tha t
the "Growth and Investment Tax Plall, although implemented using the subtraction
method, would similarly requi re that deductible purchases be allowed only from businesses
that are subject to the tax, and that these purchases be substantiated." Tax Reform Panel
Report, note 11. at 163. A recent pure subtraction-method VAT proposal for the United
Sta tes. the "corporate activity tax" proposed by Gary Hufbauer and Paul Grieco, also provides that deductions will be ava ilable only from other registered traders. Hufbauer &
Grieco, note 20, at 70-7 1.
33 Senators Boren and Danforth proposed a 14.5% subtraction-method VAT to replace
the corporate income tax, the individual income tax on undistributed profits of passth rou gh entities, and one-half of the Social Security tax. S. 2160, J03d Congo (1994), 140
Congo Rec. 56, 524 (dai ly ed. June 7, 1994); see also John C. Danforth & David L. Boren,
The Comprehensive Tax Restructu ri ng and Simplification Act of 1994: Technical Overview (May 26, 1994),94 TNT 103-26, May 27, 1994, available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File;
Cliff Massa III, "The Business Activities Tax"-A Prime r, 64 TaX" Notes 1219, 1222, 1227
(Aug. 29, 1994).
34 Gibbons proposed a 20% subtractio n-method VAT to re place all federal income taxes
and Social Security and Medicare employment taxes. A rebate of VAT to low-income
individuals and a "burden assessment" on high·income individuals were meant to keep the
proposal distributionally neutral. H.R. 4050, l04th Congo (1996).
35 An earlier proposal made by Congressman Richard Schulze also did not impose an
invoice requirement, but did deny deductions for payments made to certai n domestic enti·
ties that were exempt from the subtraction-melhod VAT proposed by the bill. H.R.3170,
102d Congo (1991).
36 Steve Forbes, Flat Tax Revolution: Using a Postcard to Abolish the IRS (2OOS).
37 Many subtraction-method VAT proposals simply do not add ress the question of
whether to incorporate an invoice requirement.
)8 See nOies 13-14.
39 Japanese Ministry of Fin., Comprehensive Handboo k of Japanese Taxes 2(1()6, at 173
(2006), available at hup:/lwww.mof.go.;p/englishltaxltaxes2006e_e.pdf.
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business purchases of such person for the taxable period, and defined
the term business purchase to exclude any amount paid or incurred
for the import of property or services. 40 The Boren·Danforth proposa l reaches the same result by taxi ng the import of property or services into the United States and then providing a deduction fo r
purchases of imports by registered traders.41
Thus, the Japanese VAT and the Gibbons and Boren-Danforth proposals are all sophisticated systems internationally, but remain open
subtraction-method VATs domestically .42 They are not sophisticated
subtraction-method VATs because they allow purchases from domestic entities that are not registered traders to be deducted. In this regard, a 2007 Japanese national tax reform commission concluded that
full adoption of the credit-invoice met hod would improve the reliability and transparency ofthe Japanese VAT, but expressed concerns regarding the consequence of such re form for preferences provided to
small businesses under Japan 's current system.43
Closing the system internationally is an exception t~ the general
availability of deductions in the Gibbons and Boren-Danforth proposals. The Gibbons and Boren-Danforth proposals are closed inte rnationally as part of an effort to achieve destination-basis taxation for
the subtraction-method VAT. VATs can be imposed on either a destination basis or an origin basis.44 A destination-basis tax excludes exports from the tax base and includes imports in the tax base. An
origin-basis tax includes exports in the tax base and excludes imports
from the tax base. Credit-invoice method VATs generally are imposed on a destination basis. Th us domestic consumption is taxed regardless of where the goods being consumed are produced. If a
subtraction-method VAT were imposed on the origin basis, foreign produced goods and services would not be subject to the VAT on the
portion of value added abroad when consumed in the United States,
while U.S.-produced goods and services would continue to be subject
H.R. 4050, no te 34, § 201.
S. 2160, note 33, § 301.
42 See Weisbach, note 25, at 615.
• ) Tax Comm'n, Japanese Minislry of Fin., Basic Idea for Fundamental Reform of Tax
System 28 (2007), available at htlp:/(www.mof.go.jpJenglish/taxleQ71Ia.pdf: see also note
136 and accompanyi ng text.
-44 For helpful discussions of the in ternati onal implications of consumption tax proposals,
see Re uven S. Avi-Yo nah , From Income 10 Consumption Tax: Some lnternatio nallmplications, 33 San Diego L. Rev, 1329 (1996); David F. Bradford, Blue prin t for International
Tax Reform, 26 Brook. J . Int'l L. 1449 (2001); Michael J. Gracu, Inte rn ational A spects of
Fundamental Tax Restructuring: Practice or Principle?, 51 U. Miami L. Rev. 1093 (1997);
Harry Grubert & T . Scott Newlon, The International Implications of Consumption Tax
Proposals, 48 Nat'l Tax J, 619 (1995); Ste phen E. Shay & Victoria P. Summers, Selected
Inte rnational Aspects o f Fundamental Tax Reform Proposals, 51 U. Miami L Rev. 1029
(1997).
.II)
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to the VAT when consumed abroad under the standard credit-invoice
method VATs imposed around the world. 45 Many subtraction-method
VAT proponents view that result as raising a competitiveness issue,
and propose closing the system internationally to address this concern46 -although economists generally suggest that such treatment
should not affect a country's trade position.'H Further issues associated with the taxation of imports and exports under credit-invoice and
subtraction-method VATs are discussed in Part III. In the domestic
context, however, proponents of U.S. subtraction-method VAT proposals recommend an open system on simplification grounds. The
goal is described as allowing " businesses to use their most basic financial data to compute tax liability."48
III.

KEy D ESICN FEATURES IN Tl1 E SUBTRACTION-METI10D AND
CREDIT-INVOICE M ETHOO

A.

VATs

Deductions for Purchases from Nontaxpayers

As a result of deductions by purchase rs that are not offset by corresponding inclusions by sellers, any open subtraction-method VAT
would be susceptible to significant tax avoidance. Limiting deductions
4S Ma ny U.S. companies oppose this treatment of exports a nd imports. Hufbauer &
Grieco, nOle 20, at 57; Carol Gabyzon & Gary C. Hufba uer, Fundamenlal Tax Reform and
Border Adjustments (1996). The Flat Tax and the original X-Tax proposal, bOlh discussed
in note 4, we re o rigin-based and therefore lacked borde r adjuslments, which made them
less anractive to U.S. companies.
46 See, e.g., Hulba uer & Grieco, note 20; David A . Hartman, Proposal for Comprehensive Tax Refo rm via Ihe Business Transfer Tax, Submission 10 the President's Advisory
Panel on Federal Tax Reform (Apr. 29, 2(1(}5), al hllp:lIgovinfo.1ibrary.unt.edultaxreform
panellcommenls/index8859.hlml?FuseAction=Home.View&To pic_id==3&FellowType_id
==4.
47 Because an origin-based tax does not tax the full value of imported goods and services
that arc consumed domestically, it appears 10 favor imports. Economic theory suggests the
benefit to imporls from o rigin -basis treatment will be offset by currency exchange rates or
o ther changes in the price level. The most basic nOlion is that a currency appreciation
triggered by border adjustments will negate any permanent improvement in competitiveness. See, e.g., Alan D. Viard, Border Adjustmenls Won't Promote Compeliliveness, 105
Tax Notes 122, 122 (Oct. 4, 20(4). Some ana lysts poinl out, however, that "fundamental"
forces do not easily explain exchange rale adjustments. If exchange rates do not adj ust
properly, economic theory suggests that in the long run, the relevant adjustments could
occur through adjuslments in domestic prices and wages. The possibility that adjustments
would occur other than through exchange ra tes and over an extended Iransition period has
been a source of concern for various analysts, including the Tax Reform Panel. Tax Reform Panel Report, note 11 , at 173. FUTlhermore, these adj uslments will nOI appea r cerlain, while border adjustments are both immediate a nd certain, such thai U.S. companies
do nOl readily accept economists' ass urances in this rega rd. See, e.g., Graetz. nOle 18, al
81.
48 David L Boren , Siale ment Before the Bipartisan Commissio n on Entille meDt and
Tax Reform (Oct. 6, 1994), re printed in 94 TNT 198-38, Oct. 7, 1994. available in LEXlS,
Tax AnalysIS File.
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for imports (as is done in the Boren-Danforth and Gibbons proposals)
can solve this problem with respect to cross-border transactions, but
does not address the problem more generally. Thus, even if the VAT
is closed internationally, the absence of an invoice requirement or
simil ar limit ation could significantly reduce the amount of revenue the
VAT collects for the fisc.
David Bradford, David Weisbach, and Joseph Bankman and
Michael Schier detail various potenti al problems of adopting a consumption tax system in which deductions are ge nera lly available for
inputs on which consumption tax was nol paid by the seller. 49 One
importa nt concern is susceptibility to transfer pricing abuse. 5O Transfer prices are the amount charged by re lated e ntities in sales and
transfers to one another. These entities have incentives to set prices in
their transactions with one another to minimize tax, rather than on an
arm's length basis. The transfer pricing problem can be ameliorated if
the VAT is closed in te rnationally and coexists with an income tax system domestically.
Another important problem arises because the VAT is a tax on consumpt ion-fi nancial transactions are excl uded. Thus, VATs do not require inclusion of in te rest or divid ends received, and do not provide
deductions for interest paid. This feature makes the tax economically
e fficient, and is also an important reason the tax is simple. Maintaining th e efficiency and simplicity of the VAT, however, requires drawing a sharp distinction between "real" and financial transact ions.
Taxpayers would find it easy to manipulate that distinction to their
advantage in an open subtraction-method system. 51
Bankrnan and SchIer provide the example of a taxpaye r entering
into offsetting long and short forward contracts for the delivery of
goods, The taxpayer settles the favorable side of the stradd le for cash,
resulting in nontaxable gain from a financial transaction , and takes
delivery on the unfavorable transaction, resulting in a deductible
purchase. 52 Imagine an airline th at enters into two forward con., See Bradford. X-Tax, note 4; Weisbach nOle 25; Joseph Bankman & Michael Sch ier,
Tax Planning Unde r the Flat TaxIX-Tax 19 (Sept. 12, 2005), (draft, available at http://
www.americantaxpolicyinslitute.orpjpdflFaIIConference2005INYCorp_2532993_3.pdf).
so Bradford focused heavily on the transfer pricing concern in the course of his writings
regarding Ihe international aspects of the X-Tax. See, e.g., Bradfo rd, X-Tax, note 4.
SL The distinction between exempt financial instilutions and other inslitu tions is also
susceptible 10 mani pulation in slandard credil-invoice met hod VATs to reduce VAT liability among related parties. See, e.g., Case C-255JOZ, Halifax v. Comm'rs of Customs &
Excise, 2006 E.CR. 1-01609; Peter Nias & Amy Manchia, Halifax Judgment Raises VAT
Planning Questions, 42 Tax Notes Inl'l 7 (Apr. 3, 2006).
52 Bankman & Schier, note 49, at 19. Other examples provided by Weisbach and Bankman and Schier, such as valuation problems associated with sales of assets by an individual
to a business that they own . id. at 43; Weisbach note 25, at 632·33, may be less severe in a
panial replacement VAT tha n in the full replacement consumption tax scenario those au-
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tracts~one to buy fuel at $2 per gallon, and one to sell fuel at $2 per
gallon. If fuel costs $3 at the closing date of the contract, the airline
could close out the long contract to buy fuel for $1 in cash, spend $3 to
buy fuel on the market, deduct $3, and deliver that fuel to the
counterparty of the unfavorable contract for $3. The airline has $1 in
nontaxable financial gain, and $1 of net VAT deduction. In contrast , if
fuel costs $1 at the closing date of the contract, the airline could close
out the short contract to sell fuel for $1 in nontaxable financial gain,
take delivery on the unfavorable contract for $2, and either use the
fuel or reseH it fOf $1, in either case providing an extra $1 of net VAT
deduction. In a system with an invoice requirement, however, the
purchases of fuel will be deductible only if they are offset by taxable
inclusions to registered traders. As a result, there will be no overall
loss to the tax system. In an open subtraction-method VAT, however,
a transaction involving a nonregistered trader (who therefore would
not have a VAT inclusion) would result in a deduction for a registered
trader. Weisbach suggests that in an open subtraction-method VAT
"[gJiven that no risk is involved, businesses can use this type of transaction to eliminate business taxes at any time by simply doing it in
greater size. " 53
Standard credit-invoice method systems avoid this issue by denying
input credits for purchases from nonregistered traders. A sophisti cated subtraction-method VAT produces the same result by making
purchases [rom nonregistered traders nondeductible.

B.

Exemptions and Input Taxation

Subtraction-method VAT advocates suggest that as an entity-based
tax, the system is less susceptible to exemptions for specific goods and
services than a credit-invoice method VAT.54 In an open subtractionmethod VAT, however, the lack of matching between deductions and
inclusions creates an incentive for lobbying for inappropriate tax exemptions by producers of intermediate inputs. The Japanese example
also suggests subtraction-method VATs may include exemptions.
Moreover, some exemptions may be appropriate or inevitable in any
VAT. Finally, while a sophisticated subtraction-method VAT may be
less susceptible to exemptions for specific goods and services, it may
be more likely to be implemented with inappropriate entity-based
exemptions.
thors consider, depending on the tax (;onsequcnces to the nonregistered trader under the
remaining income tax system.
~J Weisba(;h . note 25. at 616.
54 See, e.g., William Morris, A "National Debate" on VAT: The Gibbons Proposal, 93
TNT 182-103 (Sept. 1, 1993), available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File.
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VATs typica lly provide three di ffere nt types of exe mptio ns. First,
supplies of goods and services provided by government entities, as
we ll as nonprofit organizations, charitable organizations, and simil ar
tax-exe mpt entities are o ft en exempted from the VAT for admini strati ve, distribut ional, or othe r policy reasons. 55 Second, for si mil ar reasons, specifi c goods and services (for exa mple, "merit goods" like
educational services and health services) may a lso be exempted from
the VAT regardless of the nature of the e ntity that makes the s upplies. 56 Finally, small businesses may receive entity exemptions in recognitio n of the constraints o n their administrative capacity.57
lmportantly, VATs, whether of the credit-invoice met hod or subtraction-me th od type, generally do not provide exe mptions for categories
of purchase rs, as is commo nly done in RSTs.58 VATs do provide
somewhat simil ar treat ment, however, by offeri ng refunds of input tax
paid with respect to supplies that are not taxed. This mechanism is
known as "zero-rating."59 This Secti on deals only with ce rtain issues
that arise generally in relati on to the provisio n of an exempt good or
service ("exempt supplies"). Issues related to zero-rating, and the
policy issues posed by VAT exemptio ns or zero-rating that benefit
specific categories of entities, notably no nprofit and charitable organizations, state and local governme nts, small business, and exporters are
discussed in late r Sections.
In a cred it-in voice method VAT , no VAT is coll ected on exempt
supplies. Si milarly, a registered trader wi ll not receive input cred its
~~ See, e.g .. Council Directive 2006/1 12, art. 132,2006 O.J. (L 347) I (EC) Ihe reinafler
EU VAT Directive].
~ See, e.g., Excise Tax Act, R.S.c., ch. E IS § 223(1)(2009) (Can.), available at hnp:1I
laws.justice.gc.calen/E-15/i ndex.h tml [hereinafter Canada ETAJ; see Pierre-Pascal Gen·
d ron, How Shou ld the US. Treat Govern ment Entities, Nonprofit Organ ilations, and
Other Ta)[-Exempt Bodies Unde r a VAT?, 63 Tax L. Rev. 477 (2010): see also Office of Tax
PoI'y, U.S. Treas. Dep't, App roaches to Improve the Competitiveness of the U.s. Business
Tax System for the 21st Century 22 (2007), available al htt p://www.ustreas.gov/pressf
releascs/reportslhp749_approachesstudy.pdf.
~7 Small Manufacturers or Producers Exemption Regula tions (Excise Tax Act) SOR/82498 (Can.) available at http://www.ca nlii.orglen/callawsJregu/sor-82-498Ilatest/sor-82·
498.ht ml; see Michael J. G raetl, 100 Million Unnecessary Retu rns: A Fresh Start fo r the
U.s. Tax System, 112 Yale LJ . 261, 287-88 (2002); Gen. Accoun ting Office, Tax Adm inistration: Potential Impact of Alternative Taxes on Taxpayers and Ad ministra tors 140
(1998), available at htt p://www.gao.gov/a rchiveJl9981gg98037.pdf; Ebrill e t a I., note 16, ch.

I!.

S8 Some exceptions may apply in some jurisdictions. for example in the case of exports
o r readily identifiable sales to governmcnts and mul tilate ral institutio ns. See Schenk &
Oldman, note 13, a t 298; Charles E. McLu re, Jr., How to Coordina te State and Local Sales
Taxes with a Federal Value-Added Tax, 63 Tax L. Rev. 639 (2010).
39 Zero-ra ti ng mea ns that, while VAT is charged at a lero rate on Ihe supply of goods or
services, the supplie r remains e ntitled to claim in put tax credit for input tax incurred in
ma king that supply, and the refore may be eligible fo r a refund of input lax pa id. Zerorating is discussed at Section III.o .
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for inputs associated with the provision of exempt supplies. In a subtraction~method VAT, revenues from the sale of exempt supplies are
excluded from the registered trader's VAT base. A sophisticated subtraction-method VAT would also deny deductions for inputs associated with the exempt good or service. For this reason, exemption in a
credit-invoice method VAT or a sophisticated subtraction-method
VAT can also be characterized as "input taxation." In contrast, exemption in an open subtraction-method VAT will not result in the denial of deductions associated with the exempt good or service,
producing a gap in the tax base.
Thus, while exemption of an intermediate-stage good or service in
an open subtraction-method VAT reduces total tax collected in the
value chain, exemption of an intermediate-stage good or service in a
credit-invoice method VAT increases total tax collected in the value
chain. Using the facts of Example I, Example 3 suggests that if wine
sold by a winemaker is exempt under a credit-invoice method VAT,
$100 of that wine, when sold by a retailer to an end consumer, will
bear $26 of VAT on the inputs and final product. In contrast, if the
same $100 of wine is sold by a retailer under an open subtractionmethod VAT with an exemption for sales by the winemaker, the wine
will bear only $12 of VAT.
EXAMPLE 3

Basic Transactions
Sales
Purchases
Value added (sales - purchases)

Grape
Grower

Winemaker

Retailer

Total

$30
0
30

$70
30
40

$100
70
30

$100

Credit-Invoice Method VAT
Tax on sales (20% of line 1)
Less: input tax on purchases
Net VAT liability

6
0
6

Exempt
6
Exempt

20
0
20

26

Open Subtraction-Method VAT
VAT liability (20% of line 3)

6

Exempt

6

12

A standard credit-invoice method VAT regime does not provide the
retailer with an input credit for wine purchased from the winemaker
because no VAT was assessed on the sale of the wine. In addition, the
retailer does not receive a credit for the $6 VAT paid by the
winemaker on its purchase of grapes, the tax cost of which will be
passed on to the retailer in the price of the wine. Thus, a credit-invoice method VAT with an exemption for an intermediate-stage good
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cascades, resulting in a tax burden on consumption of the final good
that is higher than the standard VAT rate, and an incentive for se lf·
supply of the exempt intennediate input by seUers of the final good.
In contrast, in an open subtraction-met hod VAT (where the VAT is
calculated based on total sales and total purchases) whether the
winemaker's sales were exempt from the VAT is irreleva nt to the calculation of the retailer's subtraction-method VAT liability.
Advocates of subtraction-method VATs may claim th at such a VAT
is more likely 10 be imposed on a broad base, and avoid exemptions
for specific goods and services because it is entity-based. 60 Under the
credit-invoice method VAT, however, providers of intermediate goods
prefer their sales to be fully taxed. if they are not , goods and services
that incorporate their products become more expensive to final consumers. In contrast, an open subtraction-method VAT with an exemption for an intermediate good produces a lowe r-than-standard tax
burden on consumption of the final gOOd. An open subtractionmethod VAT therefore invites lobbying for special treatment by providers of intermediate inputs to other businesses. 61 The reduction in
the tax collected in the value-added chain creates a tax- induced preference for their goods or services if those goods or services are
exempt.
These results are not, however, due to the credit method or subtraction method of calculation. A sophisticated subtraction-method VAT
would deny a ded uction to the re tailer for the purchase of the case of
wine in Example 3, producing the same effect as under the credit-invoice method VAT.62 In that case, the winemaker would prefer to be
taxed rather th an to be exempt, as in the cred it-invoice method VAT.
Thus, one might believe that a sophisticated subtraction-method
VAT would be more likely to avoid exemptions for specific goods and
se rvices than a credit-invoice method VAT. On the other hand , the
Japanese VAT, which is largely a closed system, has some of the same
exemptions one finds in most credit-invoice method VATs. For example, the Japanese exempt supplies of medical services and ed ucational
services. 6J The Japanese example would see m to cast doubt on the
claim that an entity-based system of calculation limits exemptions for
socia lly preferred goods and services.
60 See, e.g., Hufbauer & Grieco, note 20, at 71; sec also Danforth & Boren, note 33.
61 McLure, nOIC 24, at 75.
62 Mintz., nOle 21, at 76-77; Charles E. McLure, Jr., Economic, Administrative, and Political Factors in Choosing a General Consumption Tax, 46 Nat'l Tax J, 345, 350 (1993).
6J The Japanese VAT also exemptS other so-<:alled social welfare services (for example.
Japan exempts meal delivery to the elderly, crematory services, and equipment for the
physically handicapped), See Japanese MiniSlry of Finance, nOle 39, at 156-57.
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Furthermore, although the re are good policy arguments for minimizing exemptions ge nerally, no country has removed all exemptions
fro m its VAT.64 The broad, but rea listic, consumption tax base recommended in 2005 by the Tax R eform Panel fo r the credit-invoice
method VAT it studied fo r the United States would include about
60% of GDP.65 New Zealand has the broadest VAT base in use in the
DEeD to day, but still offers ce rtain exemptio ns, includ ing fo r residential accommodatio n, certa in supplies made by nonprofit e ntities,
and the supply of certain fine metals.66 In the rest of the DEe D , services like health care and education often are referred to as pOlitica lly
" untouchable," and exempte d, or given more preferenti al treatme nt
through zero-rating.67 The Tax Reform Panel recommended exempting charitable and religious services, leases of residential housing, and
sales of pre-existing owner-occupied housing in the parti al replacement VAT it studied for the United States. 68 Design planning for a
VAT should likely be prepare d to accommodate at least some exemptions for specific goods and services.
While using the subtraction-method lens to design a VAT may make
exemptions of specific goods and services less likely, it also may make
entity-based exemptions more like ly. Limited li ability corporati ons, S
corporations, partnershi ps, and sole proprietorshi ps are not subj ect to
the curre nt U.S. corporate income tax. Rather, their income is generally taxed to individual owne rs, who flow the income through to their
individual income tax re turn s. 69 O ne recent subtraction-method VAT
proposal, put forth by Hufbauer and Grieco, exe mpts such [Jowthrough e ntities fro m being registered trade rs, on the theory that they
are not subject to the current corporate income tax. 70 In studyin g a
subtraction-method VAT approach to business tax reform in the
United Stat es, the U.S. Treasury Depa rtment's re port similarl y considered, as one of th e potenti al issues, whethe r flo w-through entities
would be treated as registe re d traders. 7 1 In a VAT, however, wide64 David Williams, Value_Added Tax, in I Tax Law Design and Drafting 204 (Victor
Thuro nyi cd., 1996); New Zealand Inland Reve nue, Exempt Supplies, available al htt p://
www.ird.govt. n7Jgstladditional-calcs/ca]c-spec-supplies/calc-exempt (last visited Feb. 13.
2010).
~ Tax Refonn Panel Report, note 11, at 249-55.
66 New Zealand Inland Revenue, note 64; Sche nk & Oldman, note 13, at 289.
67 See, e.g., David Whi te, The Serious Research Gap on VAT/GST: A New Zealand
Perspective Afte r 20 Years of GST, IS lnt'l VAT Monito r 343 (2007); Ge nd ro n, note 56, a t
716 n.5 1. Domestic zero-rati ng of goods a nd services is discussed in Sectio n 111.0.
68 Tax Refonn Panel Report, note Il , at 250-52.
69 See IRC § 701 (partnerships), § 1361 (S corporations); Reg. § 3301.7701-3(b) (limited
liability companies).
70 Hufba uer & Grieco. note 20, a t 71.
71 Treasury Dep't, no te 56, at 27-55; sec also U.S.-Chi na Econ. a nd Securit y Rev.
Comm'n. Compre hensive Reform for U.s. Business Taxation (May 20, 2005) (statement of
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spread exemptions for businesses across many sectors of the economy
could undermine the integrity of the tax system.72 Flow-t hrough businesses account for about one-third of gross business receipts in the
United States. 73 While in a broadly-applicable VAT busin esses do not
have an incentive to avoid paying VAT on the ir purchases (because
they receive input credits), businesses that make exempt su pplies, and
therefore are in eligible for input credits, do have an incentive to avoid
or evade VAT. Some subtraction-method VAT proposals have recognized this issue and subjected now-through entities to VAT, while
others have 0 01.1 4 The key point is th at using the subtract ion-method
lens opens this design issue to discussion- which would not be the
case in a credit-i nvoice method VAT understood as a tax imposed at
the cash register.15
C.

Multiple VAT Rutes

Conventional analysis highlights that a credit-invoice method VAT,
as distinct from a subtraction-method VAT, provides the flexibility to
impose preferential tax rates on specific goods or services. Preferential tax rates for specific goods and services are generally undesirable.
As a practical matter, however, policymakers may choose to im pose
multi ple rates.
Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Pau l LE. Griero). available at htfp:l/www.uscc.gov/hearingsl20051
hearingslwrittcn_testimonieslO5 _05_19_2Owrtslhufba uer....gary_wrts.php) (proposing to retain the income tax di!ninction between Subchapter C corporations and pass-through firms
in a subtraction-method VAT).
72 Williams, note 64, HI 208.
n Treasury Dep't, Treasury Conference on Business Taxation and G lobal Competi tiveness, Background Paper 12 (Jul y 23, 2001). available at http://www.uSlfeas.gov/press/reIcaseslreports/01230. pdr.
7~ Compare Danforth & Boren, note 33 (subjecting all flow-through entities to VAT),
with Hufbauer & Griero, note 20. at 71 (exempting them).
7S In a subtraction·method VAT, the policy debate may be posed with refercnce to the
~ income" of noncorporate business entities. and as a result income tax assump tions may
influence policymaking. See Hufba uer & Griero, note 20. at 39 (describing thei r "Corporale Activities Tax" proposal as a "business lax"). A somewhat related issue involves
whether financial accounting would treat the credit-invoice method VAT and the subtraction-method VAT similarly or differently, and how firms would respond to the two taxes as
a result. While a credit-invoice method VAT would be accounted for like a sales tax, a
question might arise as to whether a subtraction-method VAT could or should be accounted for like an income tax. Clear guidance on the appropriate accounting ror subtraction-method VATs is not available in the accoun ting literature under either U.s. GAAP Of
IFRS. cr. Fin. Acetg. Stand. Bd, EITF 06-3, How Taxes Collected born Customers and
Remitted to Governmental Authorities Should Be Presented in the Income Statement
(That Is, Gross versus Net Presentation) (2006), available at http://www.rasb.orglcsIBlob
Server?bIObcol:urldata&blobtable=M ungoBlobs& blobkey=id&blobwhere; 117 58187402
08&blobheader:application%2Fpdf.
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Returning to Example 1, imagine that grapes are taxed at 10%
rather than 20%. As shown in Example 4, the grape grower will still
net $30 after tax, but will charge only $33 and remit only $3 to the
government, rather than charging $36 and remitting $6 as in Example
2. The winemaker, in tum, will still charge $84 ($70 + 20% VAT, because she is selling wine, not grapes, and wine is subject to the standard 20% VAT rate).
EXAMPLE 4

Grape
Grower

Winemaker

Retailer

Total

$30
0

$70

30

40

$100
70
30

$100

3
0
$ 3

14
3
$11

Basic Transoctions
Pre-tax sales
Pre-tax purchases
Value added (sales - purchases)

30

Credit-Invoice Method VAT
Tax on sales (10% of line 1 for
grapes, 20% otherwise)
Less: input tax on purchases
Net VAT liability

20
14
$ 6

$ 20

The only difference between Example 2 and Example 4 is that instead of subtracting $6 in tax already paid to determine what to remit
to the government, the winemaker subtracts $3 from the $14 he collects from the retailer, thereby paying $11 to the government. As a
result , the same total amount is remitted to the government, and the
preferential rate for grapes does not pass through. If, however, the
grapes are purchased by the retailer and sold for consumption as fresh
fruit, the preferential 10% rate for grapes will continue to apply and
pass through to the final consumer. The same retailer will apply the
standard 20% VAT rate on bottles of wine it sells.
In contrast, without an invoice requirement, even a sophisticated
subtraction-method VAT, cannot feasibly be administered with multiple tax rates. Imagine a corner store that only sells fresh grapes and
wine. It buys $200 of grapes and wine from registered traders, and has
$300 of sales. If there are different lax rates for grapes and for wine,
simply subtracting the value of the corner store's nonlabor inputs
(grapes and wine) from the total value of its sales and then mUltiplying by the VAT rate will not work to determine its VAT liability. To
replicate the tax burden that the corner store would remit to the government in a credit-invoice method VAT, the tax authorities must
know not only what part consisted of grapes and what part of the retailer's sales consisted of wine, but what part of the retailer'S inputs
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consisted of grapes, what part consisted of wine, and the tax rate paid
on each o f these inputs, In the absence of an invoice requirement (or
comparable info rmatio n co llectio n) the necessary info rmatio n is no t
available.16
At a theoretical level, it may be possibl e to impose multiple rates
under a sophisticated subtraction -method VAT with a full invoice requirement. Such a system seems highly complex at best . 1t would
make partial exemptions and partial deductions the norm , rather than
an exception. Consider again the example in which fresh fruit is taxed
at a preferenti al rate, and a corner store sells fresh grapes and wine. If
there are mUltiple rates and the corner store is to determine tax due in
a single account, it must someho w " adjust" the value of its sales subject to the preferential rale .77 One way to do this might be to treat
such sales as partially exempt. But fo r the calcul ation to work properly, the adjustment must be to pretax sales, rather than post-tax
sales,78 Thus, instead of booking $120 of grape sales, the corne r store
might book o ne-half the pretax value of such sales grossed up as if to
include full VAT. Similarly, to account fo r deductions, it might deduct
one-half the pretax cost of the grapes it bought from registe red traders
grossed up as if to include full VAT. With multiple preferential rates,
the math would become even more complica ted. These calculations
are very different from using summary fin ancial statement information to simply subtract the value of the store's nonlabo r inputs from
the to tal value of its sa les and then multiply by the VAT rate to de termine tax liability. Mo re importantly, such calculatio ns effectively require determining tax liability with respect to individual classes o f

76

Ge n. Acco unti ng O ffice, no te 31, al 23.

n Exposi tion thro ugh an example ma y be eased somewhal by providing both tax-exclusive and tax-inclusive tax rales. Imagi ne Ihe corner SlOre pays $100 fo r grapes purchased
from registered traders ($90.91 of grapes, plus $9.09 of VAT imposed at a 10% tax-excl usive rate, o r a 9.09% lax-inclusive rate). It has $109.09 pre-VAT of grape sales. The corne r
store pays $100 for wine purchased from registe red trade rs ($83.33 of wine, plus $16.67 of
VAT imposed al a 20% lax-cl[clusivef16.66% lax-i nclusive rale). It has $150 pre-VAT of
wine sales. The corne r store also purchases other business inpuls, such as price labels and
shelving, used to sell both the grapes and Ihe wine, for $12 ($10 plus $2 of VAT imposed a t
20% lax-el[clusive/16.66% lax-inclusive). The store sells the grapes for $120 ($ 109.10 plus
$10.90 of VAT imposed al a 10% lax-txclusive/9.09% tax inclusive), and the wine fo r $180
($ 150 plus $30 of VAT imposed al 20% tax-exclusiveI16.66% tax-inclusive). To adjust the
value of its sales subject 10 the prefere ntial ra te, instead of bookin g $120 of grape sales, the
corner Slore mighl book one-half the pre tal[ value of such sales, grossed up as if to incl ude
full VAT ($54.54 of prelal[ grape sales, plus $10.90 of hypothelical VAT , for a to tal inclusion of $65.44). Similarl y, to account for deductions, it might deduct o nl y one-half the
pre tax cost of Ihe grapes it bought from registered (Taders, grossed up as if to include full
VAT ($45.45 of pretax grape sales, plus $9.09 ofh ypolhelical VAT, fo r a $54.54 deductio n).
18 See note 77.
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supplies. They would "transform the subtraction method
. into
something like the invoice method. "79
Commentators frequently view the oddity of imposing multiple
rates under a subtraction-method VAT as an advantage of the subtrac-

tion-method.so Most experts recommend that an ideal VAT generally
should be imposed with a single non-zero rate.S ] Preferential rates,
like inappropriate exemptions of specific goods and services, undermine revenues, impede administration, and reduce efficiency.82
Policymakers, however, may feel compelled to impose design features that vary from the academic ideal. A significant number of
GEeD countries maintain at least one non-zero preferential tax rate
as part of their VATs.s3 The U.S. Treasury Department noted that
there may be policy reasons to reduce or eliminate the rate of a VAT
on "merit goods," such as education, health care, welfare services, cultural activities, and religious and charitable activities. 54 It also pointed
out that while a lower VAT rate for necessities generally is viewed as
an inefficient way to address perceived regressivity, policymakers
could decide to tax food, electricity, heating oil and gas, and clothing
at a lower rate. S5 Of interest in tbis regard are tbe conclusions of a
2007 Japanese national tax reform commission that studied various
potential tax reforms for Japan , including the possibility of adopting
multiple VAT rates. The commission concluded that a subtractionmethod VAT with multiple rates would not be enforceable, so that if
Japan were to adopt a multiple rate structure, it would also need to
adopt a credit-invoice system for its VAT.86
In comparing credit-invoice and subtraction-method VATs, the
multiple rate issue may require a judgment regarding the political
probability associated with various vagaries of the legislative process.
Choosing a subtraction-method VAT may make the use of multiple
rates less likely, as shown by the findings of the Japanese tax reform
commission. A credit-invoice method VAT, however, is equally able
to be imposed with a single non-zero rate. In fact , more than 70% of
Ebrill et al., note 16, at 9-12.
See, e.g., Oliver Oldman & Alan Schenk , The Business Activities Tax: Have Senators
Danforth and Boren Discovered a Better Value-Added Tax?, 10 Tax Notes lot'155 (Jan. 2,
1995).
81 Ebrill et aI., note 16, at 69-82.
8:2 Gendron, note 56, at 486--89.
8J Centre for Tax Pol'y and Admin., OECD, Tax Database (Jan. 1, 2007), http://www.
oecd.orgldocument/6010,3343,en_2649_34533 _194246(U _1_1_1 ,OO.htmUitable_IVl (reporting 78.5% of DECO countries have at least o ne non-zero preferential rate). Worldwide,
approximately one-half of all VATs include at least one non-uro preferential rate. Ebrill
et ai. , note 16, al 68.
114 Treasury Dep'l, note 56, al 31.
lei Id.
86 Japanese Tax Commission, note 43, at 28.
79

80
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countries that adopted a credit-invoice method VAT in the 1990's
adopted and maintained VATs with only one positive VAT rate.87 Extant subtraction-method VAT proposals suggest that a subtractionmethod VAT is likely to deviate from VAT best practices in various
other respects, as described above with respect to deductions from
nonregistered traders and the scope of application of the VAT, and
below with respect to other issues of VAT design. Given the fact that
a credit-invoice method VAT often is imposed at one non-zero rate,
the question is what weight the prospect that it could be imposed at
multiple rates should be given relative to other considerations.
D.

Zero-Rating

Zero-rating a good or service means that while no VAT is due on
the supply, the supplier remains entitled to claim a tax offset for input
tax incurred in making that supply, and therefore may be eligible for a
refund of input tax paid. Zero-rating is used primarily to "border adjust" exports of goods and services to achieve destination-basis taxation, and can provide a full refund for VAT paid with respect to a
product in earlier stages of production and distribution. Zero-rating is
possible in both a credit-invoice method VAT and a sophisticated subtraction-method VAT. Zero-rating produces a benefit similar to exemption in an open subtraction-method VAT.
Example 5 iUustrates the mechanics of zero-rating a supply using a
VAT imposed via either the sophisticated subtraction method or the
credit-invoice method . Example 5 is identical to Example J, except
that the case of wine produced by the winemaker is purchased by an
exporter and sold abroad. As a result, the wine is zero-rated and input credit is provided to the exporter with respect to the VAT paid on
the wine at earlier stages of production. The result is that the net VAT
collected by the government on the wine is zero.

t:J

Ebrill et al., note 16, al

68~9

(data is as of 20Ot).
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Basic Transuelions
Pretax sales
Pretax purchases

Value added (sales -
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5

Grape
Grower

Winemaker

Win e Exporter

$30

$70

0
30

30
40

$100 outside the
U.S. = $0
(zero-rated)
70
-70

Total

purchases)

Credit-Invoice Method VAT
Tax on sales (20% of
6
line 1)
Less: input lax on
0
purchases
Net VAT liability
6

14

0

6

14

8

-14

SO

-14

0

Sophisticated Subtraction-Method VAT
Subtraction-method
8
6
VAT (20% of line
3)

As discussed further below, zero-rating an export is not a tax preference under the destination basis for cross-border transactions because in that case it simply reflects that exports are consumed outside
the jurisdictional reach of the national VAT and therefore should be
taxed only in the jurisdiction of consumption.

When there is a policy desire to provide a tax preference for certain
goods or services, however, some countries deem it appropriate to
zero-rate rather than exempt (that is, input tax) that good or service
even when supplied for domestic consumption. The rationale for
zero-rating domestically is that exemption (input taxation) is more appropriate where administrative considerations make it undesirable to
attempt to tax a particular good or service.88 With exemption, some
tax is maintained on the exempted good or service because the inputs
used in supplying that good or service are still taxed. If there is an
affirmative desire to consistently remove all tax from a specific good
or service, then zero-rating may be more appropriate. 89 Zero-rating
88 Sec, e.g., McLure, nOle 24, al 74---75; Aus!'! Treasury, Tax Reform: Not a New Tax, A
New Tax System 91 (Aug. 1. 1998), available at http://www.treasury.gov.au/documentslI67/
PDFlWhitepaper.pdf.
119 One corollary to the argument that zero-rating is more appropriate than exemption
when there is an affirmative desire to remove all tax from a specific good or service is that
a reduced rate (as part of a multiple rate system) is also more appropriate than an exemption if the goal is to provide a partial tax subsidy for a specifie good or service, as tbe
amount of the subsidy is known and not dependent on tbe degree of vertical integration
with respect to the supply of the good or service.
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also has the benefit of eliminating any risk of cascading taxation or
self-supply bias in connection with the zero-rated good or service. 90
Exemption in an open subtraction-method VAT effectively removes
all the tax previously collected on that good in earlier stages of production and distribution.91 Thus, in an open subtraction-method VAT
zero-rating and exemption of a final-stage supply produces a similar
benefit. An open subtraction-method system has no mechanism for
"input taxing" a good or service where administrative considerations
make exemption appropriate but maintaining some level of taxation is
desired. As the example illustrates, zero-rating is possible in both a
credit-invoice method VAT and a sophisticated subtraction-method
VAT with one non-zero rate.
E.

Goods a1td Services Provided by Government
and No,tprofit Organizations

Goods and services supplied by nonprofit organizations and government entities represent over 20% of U.S. GDP.92 Furthermore, state
and local government accounts for two-thirds of this economic activity-or almost 13% of GDP.93 The relationship between the states
and the federal government is a sensitive question with a constitutional dimension. Thus, for reasons of both economic efficiency and
political comity, a workable approach to the treatment of nonprofit
organizations and government entities under the VAT is important to
a well-administered VAT. The best practice approach focuses on the
taxation of specific supplies, rather than entities, and thus may be
more easily achieved in a credit-invoice method structure than in a
subtraction-method structure.
1.

Ideal Treatment

In his paper for this conference, Pierre-Pascal Gendron argues that
in an ideal VAT, goods and services supplied by public sector bodies
and charitable and nonprofit organizations would be within the scope
90 Thus, for example, the Tax Reform Panel suggested zero-rating educational services
and noncommercial government services in the credit-invoice method VAT it studied for
the United States. Tax Reform Panel Report, note II, at 250-52.
91 In principle, an open subtraction-method VAT could deny deductions proportionately
based on the proportion of exempt to taxable sales. [n that case, cxemption of a fin al-stage
good would produce a similar result to exemption in the credit-invoice method VAT.
92 Bureau of Econ. Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, National Economic Accounts,
National Income and Products Accounts, Tb1.1.1.10, available at hllp:Jlwww.bea.gov/na.
t ionaUnipawebffable View .asp?Se lectedTable: 14&Freq:Qtr& First Year",2008& Last Year:
2010.
93

Id.
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of a VAT.9 4 Very few such goods or services would be exempt from

the VAT.9S Goods and services supplied for no (or nominal) consideration, however, generally would be zero-rated. 96 Those goods and
services supplied by the public sector and the nonprofit sector that
compete with private sector sales would be taxed. 97 Thus, Gendron
focuses on the nature of the good or service being supplied, rather
than the entity that is supplying that good or service, in determining
how to treat the activities of governments and nonprofit
organizations.
2.

Supplies by Nonprofit Organizations

Gendron recommends that the United States severely limit zerorating and exemptions for goods and services supplied by nonprofit
and charitable organizations. 98 Gendron notes that full taxation
under a VAT for nonprofits and charitable organizations is consistent
with exempt status under the income tax because taxable status under
the VAT simply means that charitable and nonprofit entities act as
VAT collection agents for the government with respect to a tax that is,
and is widely understood to be, imposed on consumers.99 Further, because supplies for no or nominal consideration generally would not be
taxed on their implicit fair market value, those supplies by charitable
and nonprofit entities would receive treatment that is similar in effect
to zero-rating. lOO
Both a sophisticated subtraction-method VAT and a credit-invoice
method VAT could be used to implement these design recommendations. As Gendron points out, however, the rationale for full taxation
of charitable and nonprofit entities turns on thinking of these entities
as collection agents for a tax imposed on consumers, rather than as
being "consumers" subject to the tax themseives. IOI Conventionally
the credit-invoice method VAT is thought of as a tax imposed on a
consumer and collected by the selling entity at the cash register,
whereas the subtraction-method VAT is thought of as a tax that is
~ Gendron, nOie 56, at 479.
95 Id. al 508.
96 Id. at 486.
'11 Id. at 507-08.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 5Q6....07.
100 In comparison, the Boren-Danforth proposal would have subjected charities described in current § 501(c)(3) to the VAT only with respect to their business activities that
would be subject to the unrelated business income tax under currenl law (§ 512). Other
nonprofil organizations would have been fully subject to the VAT, including with respect
to the fair market value of their supplies not made for fair market value consideration.
Danforth & Boren, note 33.
101 Gendron, note 56, 3t 506.
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imposed on the entity. As a result, the conceptual framework that
justifies full taxation of nonprofit entities with zero-rating for any supplies for which they do nOl charge consideration may be an easier fit
with the credit-invoice method than the subtraction me thod .

3.

State and Local Goverrlment Services

Gendron concludes that given potential constitutional limitations in
the United States on mandating state and local governments to collect
a federal tax on the goods and services they provide, \02 the most feasible policy for the United States may be to exempt supplies by state
(and local) governments, but allow them to elect to make taxable supplies. The notion is that for a governmental entity providing mostly
public goods, opting in to collecting the VAT (and consequently receiving zero-rating for most of the goods and services they s upply) will
be more attractive than remaining exempt as an entity.t03 Again, at a
theoretical level, both a sophisticated subtraction-method VAT and a
credit-invoice method VAT could be used to implement this design
recommendation. Revealingly, however, the Japanese VAT simply
exempts local government from VAT.t 04 From a political economy
perspective, asking state and local governments to pay a s ubtraction method VAT may appear similar to asking those governments to pay
company income tax. In the United States it may be more palata ble
to ask the states to consider choosing to assess a credit-invoice method
tax on specific transactio ns where they provide commercial services
that may compete with the private sector, and providing them strong
incentives to do so through the opt-in regime recommended by
Gendron.
F.

Real Estate

The appropriate treatment of residential housing and other real
property is important in a VAT both because residential housing rep)02 Helveri ng v. Ger hard t, 304 U.S. 405,424 (1938) (upholding federa l taxation of e mployees of the Port Authority of New York as falling outside the state immunity from
federal taxa tion reserved for "essential government functions ," while noting that " there
may be state age ncies of such a characte r and so intimately associa ted with the performance of an indispensable function of state government that any laxation of it would
threaten such inte rference with the funct ions of government itself as to be considered beyond the reach of the federal taxi ng power"); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.s. 898,
935 ( 1997) ("The Federal Government may neithe r issue directives requiring the States to
address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, o r those of thelr political
subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal reg ulawry program.").
HO Gendron, note 56, at 506.
104 See Japanese Ministry of Finance, note 39, a1 182.
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resents approximately 15% of gross domestic product,IOS and because
of the political importance of residential housing. I06 Taxation of residential real properly under a VAT is complicated by issues such as
whether it would be appropriate to tax the imputed rental value of
home ownership, and also requires distinguishing between real property investment and consumption as well as personal versus business
use of real property.107 The Tax Reform Panel , consistent with the
recommendation of various experts and the general approach taken in
Canada and New Zealand,108 recommended that the sale and rental of
immovable property generally should be taxable, but that residential
rent should be exempt from VAT, as should the sale of previously
occupied residential property. t o'} Similarly, in his paper for this conference, Satya Poddar generally describes a structure that exempts
long-term residential rent, fully taxes supplies of construction services
and the first sale of new residential property, and exempts the resale
of used residential dwellings, as the most practical one for taxing residential real property under a VAT.ll o
VATs in existence around the world take a variety of approaches to
the taxation of real property, but all utilize exemption and zero-rating.
Because of the perception that exemptions and zero-rating for specific
goods and services are inappropriate in a subtraction-method system,
it may be more difficult to legislate any solution involving exemption
or zero-rating in a subtraction-method VAT. Residential rent paid to
a real estate management company may not seem deserving of exemption when the tax is perceived to be assessed on the "income" of
the e.ntity receiving the payment, rather than the individual to whom
housing is supplied. Neither the Boren-Danforth nor the Gibbons
subtraction-method VAT proposals provided special rules to exempt
residential rent , although the definition of taxable activity in those
proposals would appear to exempt the resale of owner-occupied hous-

lOS Bureau of Eco". Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Survey of Current Business,
National Data: A. Selected NiPA Tables 0-11 tb1.1.5.5 (Dec. 2009), available at http:"
www.bea.gov/scbJpdU2009112%20DecemberlD.PageslI209dp&.-a.pdf.
106 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,369, § 3(b), 10 Fed. Reg. 2323 (Jan. 7, 2005) (mandating
that the Tax Reform Panel should recommend options to make the lax code simpler, fairer,
and more conducive to economic growth, while "recognizing the importance of home
ownership").
107 See Schenk & Oldman, nOie 13, at 408--31.
108 Canada ETA, nole 56, sched. V; Goods a nd Services Tax Act 1985, 1985. S.N.Z. No.
141 § #A (N.Z.).
1Il9 Tax Rerorm Panel Report, note II, at 252; Sijbren Cnossen, VAT Treatment o( immovable Properly, in I Tax Law Design, note 64, at 231, 243-45.
110 Satya Poddar, Taxation or Housing Under a VAT, 63 Tax L Rev. 443 (2010).
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jog,l ll Poddar observes that such treatment tends to be regressive and
is not economically neutral. lI2

G.

Financial Services

As described earlier, financial payments are excluded from the VAT
base. Many financial services are therefore difficult to tax under a
VAT because implicit fees for financial services typically are imbedded in interest rate spreads and financial margins associated with fi nancial payments. The value of the financial intermedi ation fee
imbedded in these interest rate spreads and financial margins is difficult to dete rmine. As Alan Schenk explains in another paper for this
conference, the goal should be to tax at least all business-Io-business
supplies of financial services under a VAT, so that the financial institutions rendering those services can recover VAT on their business in puts just like any other firm, and so that the tax does nol cascade.113
Unfortunately " [n]o convincing conceptually correct and practical solution for capturing the bulk of financial services under the VAT has
yet been developed. "114 Many commentators generally view the total
global value of the intermediation services rendered by financial institutions to be susceptible to calculation , but no acceptable method has
been devised to calculate the value of the services rendered to each
de positor and borrower on a transaction-by-transaction basis.llS
The most common approach to the taxation of financial intermediation in credit-invoice method VATs worldwide is to exempt financial
intermediation services, thereby using input taxation as a substitute
for full taxation of fin ancial services on the theory that taxation is appropriate but impractical. I 16 Exemption of financial services (in a
credit-invoice method VAT or a sophisticated subtraction-method
VAT) produces at least two significa nt problems: cascading and selfsupply bias.! 17 An increasing number of countries are experimenting
IllS. 2160, note 33; H.R. 4050, note 34.
112 Poddar, note 110, at 452.
113 Alan & he nk., Taxation of Financial Services (Including Insurance) Under a U.s.
Value-Added Tax, 63 Tax L. Rev. 409 (2010). Cascading results from any exemption for
intermediate inputs, as described in Section 111.8.
114 Richard M. Bird & Pierre-Pascal Gendron, The VAT in Developing and Transitional
Countries 96 (2007).
II~ Sec Schenk. no te 113, at 430. The author is grateful 10 Emil Sunlcy fo r discussions
regarding this issue.
116 See, e.g., Pierre-Pasca l Gendron, Canada: VAT Treatment of Financial Services: Assessment and Policy Proposal for Developing Countries, 62 Bull. Int'l Tax'n 494, 497
(2008).
117 Cascading arises because financial services are often supplied to other businesses, for
which those financial services a re an inte rmediate input. The self-supp ly bias arises because as exempt entities, fi nancial service providers cannot make use of input credits.
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with solutions to the problems caused by exempting financial services.
For example, New Zealand recently revised its law so as to zero-rate
certain business-to-business financial services in order to reduce cascading, while continuing to exempt financial services supplied to consumers, in order to ensure that the consumption of financial services
by final consumers is taxed, partially and indirectly, by denying financial services providers full recovery of their VAT input tax.IIS Most
alternatives to exemption implemented in jurisdictions with a VAT involve distinguishing between various types of financial service supply,
so that some financial services remain exempt while others are taxable
or zero-rated.]]9 Schenk generally recommends exempting a narrow
range of specifically-defined financial services, rather than financial
services entities more generally.no
Taxation of financial services may seem simpler under a subtraction-method VAT than under a credit-invoice method VAT. Particularly in an open subtraction-method VAT, which does not endeavor 10
match deductions and inclusions, it may not seem necessary to devise
a mechanism to calculate the value of the services rendered to each
depositor and borrower on a transaction-by-transaction basis. If, however, a system were implemented to tax the total global value of the
intermediation services rendered by financial institutions, that tax
would cascade unless a mechanism were developed to allow business
users of financial services to claim input credits with respect to the
financial services supplied to them. For example, Israel taxes banks
and insurance companies under an "addition-method" VAT,12I but
the tax is administered separately from the Israeli VAT, banks and
insurance companies cannot recover VAT on their business inputs,
and the users of financial services cannot claim input credits with respect to financial services that are provided to them. ]22
In recognition of the potential cascading problem associated with
full taxation of financial service providers in a subtraction-method
VAT, the Boren-Danforth proposal required financial service providers to report the implicit charge for intermediation services to busi118 See Michael Culle n, Div. Inland Revenue Dep't, Taxation (Annual Rates. GST,
Trans·Tasman ImpUiation and Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill: Commentary on the Bill,
a va ita ble at http://www.ird.govt.nzlresources/5Jc15c 15a 1804bbe353b913ed1bc87554a301
maybill03.pdf.
1\9 See, e.g., Satya Poddar. VAT on Financial Services-Searching for a Workable Compromise. in GST in Retrospect and Prospect 186-89 (Richard Krever & David White eds.,
2007).
120 Schenk, note II3, at 438-39.
121 The addition-method VAT requires taxable entities 10 calculate tax liability by adding the cost of the firm's economic factors of production plus a measure of profit ror VAT
purposes, and multiplying the ]otal by the tax rate. See Schenk & Oldman, note 13. at 43.
122 Id. at 328.
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ness users. The proposal, however, did not provide a methodology for
determining that implicit charge. 123 The lack of such a me thodol ogy
illustrates that to avoid the cascading pro blem, a subtraction-met hod
VAT must calculate the value of the services re ndered to each recipie nt of financial services-thereby recreating the most significant problem encountered with taxing finan cial services under the creditinvoice me thod VAT. Without such a calculation, registered traders
are overtaxed on fin ancial services because VAT imbedded in finan cial services received is not recoverable by these registe red traders
when they make their own supplies. In contrast, the subtractionmethod system may make it easier to ensure full taxation of household consumption of financial services. Whether a system that overtaxes financial services supplied to business, and fully taxes financial
services supplied to consumers is preferable to a system that overtaxes
financial services supplied to business and undertaxes finan cial services supplied to consumers is not at all clear. Some commentators
suggest that the optimal rate of tax for financial services may be a
lower-than-stand ard rate. l24
While the open subtract ion-method VAT, the credit-invo ice method
VAT, and the sophisticated subtract io n-method VAT all face the sa me
challenges in structuring a workable system to properly tax fin ancial
intermediation, the open subtraction-method VAT cannot properly
manage the distinction between real and financial transactions. This
makes the manipulation of the "rea l vs. financial" distinction a source
of potential tax avoidance by nonfinancial institutio ns in the opensubtraction method VAT.12S Both th e credit-invoice method VAT and
the sophisticated subtraction -method VAT avoid this problem, and
both could accommodate exemption , zero-rating, or most other solutions fo r the taxation of financial services adopted by governments or
considered in the literature, including cash flow taxation and various
modifications thereof.126 Taxation of fin ancial se rvices is " the major
m Danforth & Boren, no te 100 ("We would expect Ihe Secretary of the Treasury 10
issue regulal ions regarding the requ irements for reasonably allocaling implicil fees among
the recipiellls of financial intcrmedialion sen'ices. These regu la lions cou ld provide general
rules fo r allocating fees for different types of fin ancia l intermediaries or specific rules for
certain fina ncial intermediaries.").
\24 Sec, e.g., Robin Boadway & Michael Keen, Theoretical Perspective on the Taxation
of Capital Income and Financial Services, in Taxation of Financiallnle rmediation: Theory
and Praclice fo r Emerging Economies 31 (Patrick Honohan ed., 2003); see also Harry
Grubert & Ja mes Mackie, Must Financial Services Be Taxed Under a Consumption Tax, 53
Na t'l Tax J. 23 (2000) (suggesting that a range of financial services provided to households
sho uld be treated as nontaxable).
125 See Section III.A.
116 See Satya Poddar & Morley English, Taxation of Financial Services Under a ValueAdded Tax, SO Nat'l Tax J. 89 (1997); Howell Zee, A New Approach to Taxing Financial
Intermediatio n Services Under a Value-Added Tax, 58 Nat'l Tax J. 77 (2005).
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remammg frontier"127 for the VAT. Fifty years of experience with
credit-invoice method VATs have led tax administrations to identify
best practices for the credit-invoice method VAT in most areas of consumption taxation. In financial services, however, no convincing best
practice has emerged. A priori, either a sophisticated subtractionmethod VAT or a credit-invoice method VAT could be used to address the relevant challenges. Nevertheless, exemption of a limited
set of specific financial services of the sort recommended by
Schenk ,l28 as well as the zero-rating approach taken by some jurisdictions, may each seem more appropriate in a credit-invoice method
VAT.

H.

Small Business

As part of their credit· invoice method VATs, approximately twothirds of OEeD countries allow small businesses to elect to be exempt
from collecting tbe VAT.I 29 Exempted businesses tend to account for
a relatively smaU fraction of gross receipts and continue to pay VAT
on their inputs, limiting the revenue loss generated by this pOlicy. no
Further, small businesses with registered traders as their main custom·
ers generally will voluntarily choose to register to collect the VAT,
even though they are eligible for exemption, in order to pass input tax
credits on to their customers. Thus an opt ion al VAT exemption for
small business, if implemented with a reasonable threshold, is administrativelyappealing. It simplifies enforcement efforts by substantially
decreasing the number of VAT returns the tax administration re·
ceives. 131 As the compliance costs associated with a VAT are low
overall, but may be disproportionately high for many small businesses,
a small business exemption also minimizes the impact that administra·
6ve costs of the VAT may have on small business. Because small businesses exempt from the credit-invoice method VAT cannot claim
input credits, and purchases from small businesses do not provide inGendron, nOle 116, at 494.
Schenk. note 113. at 438--39.
129 Treas. Dep'I, note 56, at 55.
130 Estimates for 2003 suggest that only I.S% of gross receipts in the Uniled Stales are
collected by businesses with less than $100.000 in gross receipts. Kelly Luttrell, Patrice
Treubcrt & Michael Pa risi, Inlegra ted Business Data, 2003, IRS Sta t. of Income BUll. 50
fiS.B (Fall 2(06), available al hnp:J/www.irs.gov/taxstat.slarticleJU..id=I64743.00.html. A
gross re<:eipts exemption threshold o f approximately $100,000 would e ntail rela tively little
reve nue loss fo r the fisc See U.s. Gov't Accountability Office. Tax Policy: Value·Added
Tax: Administrative Costs Vary with Complexity a nd Number of Businesses (May 3, 1993),
available al htl p:flarchive.gao.gov/t2pba t6l149097.pdf.
131 As of 2003, of the 27.5 million businesses in the United States, 21.4 million, or 77% ,
had gross receipts of less than $100,000. Luttrell et at . note 130, 8149·50, figs. A & B.
121
128
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put credits, exempting small businesses generally does not provide a
significant distortive advant age to those businesses.
A small business exemption is pro blematic in an ope n subtractionmethod VAT, because purchases from exempt small busin esses can
still be deducted by registe red traders.132 Without an invoice requirement , a small business exemption creates the potential , among other
abuses, for firms to avoid VAT li ability on inputs by purchasing from
businesses below the small business threshold , to convert nondeductible salary expenses into deductible service costs by housing the ir e mployees in se parate legal entities, and to avo id VAT co llectio n o n sales
by orga nizing their activities in a series of small enterprises. 133 A sophi sticated subtraction-method VAT should avoid this problem by
identifying and de nying deductions for supplies from a n exempt
suppli er.
The Japa nese example provi des a cautionary note abo ut the pote ntial fo r deviations from the matching principle of closed systems with
regards to small businesses in a subtraction-method VAT. The Japanese VAT in cludes rul es that allow registe red taxpayers to deduct inputs purchased from small busin esses eligible for a "simplified
system" of VAT taxation , eve n though th e VAT is not truly assessed
on the sa les of small businesses. Unde r the simplified system , these
small businesses are allowed to pay a presumptive amount of VAT
liabil ity, rather than VAT calculated based on actual sales and input
tax paid. 'l4 These rules favo ring small domestic businesses had much
broader application before 2004, when Japan lowered the threshold
above which a business is no longer eligible for the simplified system
for small businesses from taxable sa les of ¥200 million (approximately
$2 million) per taxable ye ar to taxable sa les of ¥50 million (approximately $500,000) per tax:able year. 1lS In contrast to an ideal sma ll business exemption regime, the Japanese "simplified tax system" resulted
in VAT input credits for purchases of goods on which full VAT may
132 MiniZ. note 21. at 82.
m See McLure, nole 24, al 122-23; Treas. Dep't, note 56, at 26-28. Providing a small
business exception creates some potential for firms to avoid VAT by organizing their activities in a series of small enterprises even in a credit-invoice method VAT. An ti-abuse rules
that aggregate related firms for purposes of applying the VAT threshold the refore may be
necessary. Some commentators suggest that these rules can be burdensome 10 enforce.
Bankman & Schier, note 49, at 3.
The pressure on these rules would be mueh more intense, however, without an invoice
requirement, because the tax incentives to segregate aClivities so as to qualify for exemption would be much greater.
llot Businesses with annual taxable sales of less than Y 50 million (approx 5500.000) can
choose 10 calculate their VAT input credits by mUltiplying lax liability on sales by a fixed
percentage delermincd based on a statulorily-prescri bed busincss classification system.
Japanese Ministry of Finance, nOle 39, at 178.
m Id.
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not have been assessed, and created a distortive advantage for small
businesses eligible for the simplified tax system.
The conclusions of a 2007 Japanese tax reform commission may also
be instructive in considering the politics of adopting a sophisticated
subtraction-method VAT. The commission concluded that " [t)he
adoption of an 'invoice method ' [into the Japanese VAT] would be
useful in increasing the appropriateness of an input tax credit, but at
the same time it is feared that tax-exempt business operators might be
kept out of the chain of transactions."136 The commission stated that
reform efforts needed to "strike a balance between the need to improve the reliability and transparency of the system and the need to
care for the trading realities" of small businesses,137 The reform commission's report suggests that the reason the Japanese maintain their
current hybrid credit/subtraction method system, rather than fully
adopting the credit-invoice method , is to allow other businesses deductions for purchases from small Japanese businesses that remain in
the simplified system of taxation and therefore are not fully subject to
the VAT.

I.

Exports, Imports, and Border Tax Adjustments

Every country in the OECD imposes a VAT on the destination basis with respect to cross-border transactions involving goods, although
there is less consistency in the treatment of international trade in services. !38 The choice between a destination-basis and an origin-basis
VAT !39 has consequences for a substantial part of the economy, as
gross exports represented 11% of U.S. GDP in 2008, while the value
of gross imports was equal to 13.8% of GDP}40 Fully open subtraction-method VATs are imposed on an origin basis, while imposing a
sophisticated subtraction-method VAT on a destination basis may be
susceptible to challenge under World Trade Organization rules.

136 Japanese Ta); Commission. nOle 43, al 28.
Il7 Id.
138 Schenk & Oldman, note 13, at 182-83.
139 See notes 44-45 and accompanying le);l. A destination-basis VAT e);cludes exporlS
from the 13); base and includes imports in the ta); base. Thus domestic consumption is
ta);ed regardless of where Ihe goods being consumed are produced. An origin-basis tax
includes ex ports in the la); base and e);cludes imports from the tax base. Thus, an originbasis tax is imposed on the entire value of goods and services produced domestically
(whether sold at home or abroad), but taxes only the domestic markup to the value of
imported goods and services.
'40 Bureau of Econ. Analysis, note 105, tb1.1.1.10.

2010)
1.

WHERE C REDIT IS DUE

345

Diffi.culties of Origin-Basis Taxation

An origin-basis VAT co uld be susce ptible to significant tax avoidance problems. Taxpaying businesses would be able to deduct
purchases from foreign businesses that do not pay U.S. tax . Thus taxpayers could claim deductions that would not be offset by corresponding inclusions by other U.S. taxpayers. An origin-based VAT thus
creates the same types of asymmetries that arise domestically in an
open subtraction-method VAT. Because the asymmetry arises with
respect to related foreign parties, rather than just nonregistered domestic individuals, small businesses, and other tax nonregiste red e ntities, the scope for tax avoidance may be much more severe, because
the range o f entities that can act as counterparties for avoid ance transactio ns is broader, transactions may be easier to arrange, and e nforcement of anti- abuse rules is likely to be more difficult.
A related problem with an origin-basis consumption tax is its susceptibility to transfer pricing abuse, including with respect to royalty
payments on intangible assets. ]4] Transfer pricing is also a major
problem in enforcing the income tax . Nevertheless, there are some
reasons to fear th at transfer pricing problems would be even mo re
severe under an origin-basis VAT than under the income tax. ]42
Limiting the tax base to domestic consumption by imposing the
VAT on a destination basis (taxing imports and excluding exports
from tax) resolves these issues. '43 In a destination-basis sys tem the
price established in cross-border transactions is irrelevant to the
amount of revenue collected, because purchases from abroad do not
provide a deduction and producing goods or services in the United
States that are cons umed abroad does not create taxable value added.
141 See, e.g., Bradford, X-Tal(, nOle 4. at 17·18; Tal( Reform Panel Report, note ll , al
169-70; sce note 50. and accompanying text, fo r a description of transfe r pricing issues
generall y.
142 Subpart F basc company ru les act as a partial backslop to transfer prici ng en force·
ment when U.S. multina tionals allempl ]0 shift sales or services income 10 low·tal( jurisdic·
tions. Under the curren] U.S. regime for tal(ing international income, taxation of foreign .
source income of a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. company generally is deferred un til such
time as that income is repatriated to the United States. In contrast, in an origin·basis VAT,
obtaining fo reign-source treatmenl for cash flow permanently exempts that cash now from
U.S. tal(a tion. Thus. incentives 10 manipulate ru les ]hat deem in which coun try a good or
service is " produced" and transfe r prices to minimize the value of "U.S.. produced " sales
may be stronger under a VAT than curre nt incentives to ma nipulate transfer prices and
sourcing rules to lim it current year U.S. income tax liability. See gene ra lly Michael J.
G raetz & Paul W. Oosterhuis, SUucturing an Exemption System for Foreign Income of
U.S. Corporations, 54 Na t'l Tax J. 77 1 (2001).
143 See, e.g., Tax Refonn Pane! Report, note 11, a l 169. A destina tion·basis VAT does,
however, face what David Bradfo rd referred to as the "tourism problem," whereby individuals can reduce their laxes by consuming in low·tax jurisdictions. Bradford, X-Tax, note
4.
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For example, royalties paid for foreign-created intangible assets would
not be deductible , since they are payments for imports, and royalties
received from abroad would be exempt because they represent payments for exports of intangible assets. The 2005 Tax Reform Panel
expressed a strong preference for a destination-basis consumption tax
because of the serious enforcement difficulties raised by an origin-basis consumption tax,l44

2.

Imposing a VAT on a Destination. Basis

Imposing the VAT on a destination basis requires a border adjustment. To eliminate the tax paid on an exported good by businesses at
earlier stages in the production and distribution process, exports are
zero-rated, and as a result exporters receive a credit (and therefore
perhaps a refund) for tax paid on their inputs under a credit-invoice
method system, even though no tax is assessed on their sales. On the
other hand, VAT is imposed at the border on imported goods. 14S Subsequently, an importer may claim a credit against VAT liability (or
refund) on their domestic sales.
A fully open subtraction-method VAT will not include border adjustments, because it provides deductions for all inputs, including imported inputs, and does not provide for zero-rating, In principle, a
sophisticated subtraction-method VAT with one non-zero tax rate can
be border-adjusted with exactly the same effect as a credit-invoice
method VAT. Inputs associated with export sales are simply deducted
even though export sales revenue is not included. Similarly, an importing taxpayer is denied a deduction for imports on which VAT has
not been assessed. Effectively administering border adjustments without an explicit invoice requirement requires mechanisms that allow
the tax administration to confirm that claimed exports were in fact
exported, and that inputs claimed as subtraction-method deductions
were in fact purcbased domestically from registered traders.146 As described below, providing refunds to exporters is important to the economic efficiency of a destination-basis VAT, but the possibility of
improper claims makes these refunds a source of substantial risk for
the fisc.

Tax Reform Panel Repon , note 11 , at 167.
In some instances, instead of imposing VAT at the border, EU VATs shift the liability for the VAT from suppliers to purchasers of goods and services through a mechanism
known as reverse charging. EU Vat Directive, nOle 55.
1016 Sec, e .g. , Mintz, note 21, at 83.
144

1.5
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World Trade Org anization Rules and Border Tax Adjustments

Border adjusting a subtraction-method VAT may elicit a challenge
under WTO rules. Under those rules (as originally developed under
the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), a border tax
adjustment applied to a "direct" tax is a prohibited trade subsidy.147
In contrast, WTO rules allow countries to border-adjust " indirect
taxes." Further, WTO rules require that imported products be accorded treatment no less favorable than like products of national origin. Lastly, WTO rules require that border adjustments for indirect
taxes not exceed the tax levied on similar products sold in the domestic market. 148 A subtraction-method VAT might be challenged as a
direct tax under WTO rules. The imposition of a customs duty at the
subtraction-method VAT rate on imports might be challenged as violating WTO rules. Finally, the border adjustment provided for exported goods under a subtraction-method VAT might be challenged as
being excessive.
The WTO 's Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
defines direct taxes as "taxes on wages, profits ... and all other forms
of income." 149 In contrast, indirect taxes are defined as "sales, excise,
turnover, value added ... and all taxes other than direct taxes and
import charges."'50 States do not assess sales tax on sales made by
companies inside the ir borders to customers outside the state, but income from these sales may be taxable under state corporate income
taxes. Some observers suggest that the GAIT's distinction between
direct and indirect taxes conforms to the definition of those te rms as
they are used in U.S. domestic jurisprudence.l!i' In U.S. domestic law,
an indirect tax is understood to be a tax that is imposed on goods,
rather than income or the wealth of an entity.l!i2
The 1970 GAIT Working Party on Border Tax Adjustment concluded that a "fractioned collection" tax on value added (a credit-invoice method VAT) was equivalent to a retail sales tax levied directly
on products, and thus was border-adjustable.l s3 The credit-invoice
147

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 V.N.T.S. 194, art 1I1 '14.

148 Agreemem on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh

Agreement Estabilshing the World Trade Organization, Annex I(g), Legal InstrumentsResults of the Uruguay Round vol. 1 (1994) [hereinafter ASCMJ.
149 Id. at Annex I. n.58.
ISO Id.
151 First in Series on the Extraterriroriallncome Regime, Hearing before the Subcomm.
on Select Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Congo 14 (2002)
(statement of Samuel Gibbons, Chairman, Gibbons and Company).
151 See Zenith Radio Corp v. United States, 437 V.S. 443, 446 (1978) ("(AJn indirect tax
lisJ a tax levied on the goods themselves, and computed as a percentage of the manufac_
turer's sales price rather than the income or wealth of the purchaser or seller.").
III Working Party Rcporl, Border Tax AdjuslmehlS 'I 14, U3464 (Dcc. 2, 1970).
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method VAT is thus WTO~cornpliant. Unlike a credit-invoice method
VAT, a subtraction-method VAT may not formally be treated as a tax
imposed on sales to consumers through fractioned collection. Rather,
because it is entity-based and utilizes deductions rather than credits,
the subtraction-method VAT, formalistically, could be challenged as
more akin to a tax on corporate income or profits. The rebate provided for input credits associated with exports therefore might be
deemed to be a trade subsidy. Furthermore, because the subtractionmethod VAT could be characterized as a tax on an entity, rather than
a tax on products, collecting tax on imports at the border in the conlext of a subtraction-method VAT might be susceptible to challenge as
a WTO·impermissible customs duty less favorable than that accorded
products of domestic origin, in contrast to the in·lieu·of domestic taxa·
tion portion of a credit·invoice method value·added tax.
Finally, if the deductions for exported goods in a subtraction·
method VAT were not adjusted to account for actual tax paid with
respect to inputs, and if some inputs were exempted from tax or taxed
at a lower rate, then the "rebate" provided by the deduction could
exceed the VAT imposed with respect to the inputs on the export.
GATTfWTO prohibits "exemption or remission, in respect of the pro·
duction and distribution of exported products, of indirect taxes in excess of those levied in respect of the production and distribution of
like products when sold for domestic consumption."154 [n this regard,
some commentators speculated, prior to recent amendments to the
Japanese VAT that limited the special treatment provided for small
domestic business, that the Japanese VAT could be subject to a WTO
challenge. They reasoned that while sales by small and medium-sized
businesses were exempt from Japan's VAT, purchases from these businesses were still deductible in the hands of an exporter. 155 A sophisticated subtraction-method VAT (with a single positive rate) would
avoid susceptibility to challenge on this issue if it limited deductions to
purchases from registered traders, just as the invoice-requirement
does for credit-invoice method systems. The possibility of WTO challenge, however, might lead the United States to choose an origin-basis
tax, or, in the alternative, could result in the imposition of WTO-per1S4 ASCM , nOle 148, al Annex I(g).
lS5 See Shay & Summers, nOle 44, al 1049-53, 1053 n.100. Bul see nOles 120·21 and
accompanying lext (discussing reforms to the Japanese consumption lax in 2004 Ihal substanlially reduced the scope of the special VAT Irealmenl for small business in Japan by
limiling thaI Ireatment to small businesses with laxable sales of less than 1150 million (approximately $500,000) per taxable year). Note Ihal the language of the ASCM may be
read to imply [hat Ihe question is whether remission of VAT on exports is in excess of VAT
levied on the production and distribUlion of like products domeslically, and nOI simply
whether treatmenl of exports is more favorable than domestic treatmenl of like products.
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missible sanctions if the United States were to lose a WTO challenge.
Either outcome would be highly undesirable. Selecting a credit-invoice method destination-basis tax avoids concerns about these issues.
4.

Refunds and "Losses"

Negative taxable value added arises whenever taxed inputs exceed
taxable supplies. Pure exporters generally have negative taxable
value added, because exports are generally zero-rated. Similarly,
other entities providing mostly zero-rated supplies, for example state
and local governments, will have negative taxable value added, as may
suppliers of specific goods or services subject to zero-rating. Other
registered traders may also have negative value added. For example,
any business whose investment in real assets is large relative to their
current sales can have negative value added for a taxable period.
Providing refunds or otherwise providing for prompt recovery of
tax on negative valued added is important to the integrity of the
VAT.156 Zero-rating is intended to provide input tax recovery in respect of specific supplies, which may result in particular entities being
due refunds. Failing to provide prompt input tax recovery converts
the VAT, in part, from a tax on consumption to a tax on both consumption and production. The economic efficiency arguments associated with implementing a VAT are thus greatly weakened to the
extent refunds are not prompt. One way of conceptualizing the problem is that denying refunds for negative taxable value added is
equivalent to allowing the tax to cascade (the most important efficiency criticism with respect to a retail sales tax), at least for the period the refund is denied. Failing to immediately refund tax on
negative value added also increases the effective tax rate on risky ventures, because firms will be taxed if they have positive value added,
but denied refunds if they have negative taxable value added.
The possibility of improper claims in open subtraction-method
VATs makes immediate refundability of negative taxable value added
a significant revenue risk. Without invoices to allow for audit and ensure offsetting tax revenue , the abuse potential implicit in being able
to demand a check from the fisc by claiming to have negative taxable
value added is great. 157 In other developed open economies, VAT re156 Sec, e.g., Boletin Oficial del Estado, Royal Decree 2126/2008 (2008) (Spain), available at http://www.boe.eslboe/diasl2008l12127/pdfslA52074-52078.pdf (emphasizing the need
to avoid deferring the payment of refunds, for example in the case of start-up ente rprises
and companies engaging in substantial capital investments).
m Weisbach, note 25, at 617; see also Richard M. Bird, Review of Principles and Practice of Value Added Taxalion; Lessons for Developing Countries, 41 Can. Tax J. 1222,
1223 (1993) (noting that a VAT is uniquely susceptible to fraud to the extent that a supplier's invoice in effect constitutes a check drawn on the government).
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funds often exceed 40% of gross VAT collections.15S The United
States has a substantially lower ratio of exports to GOP than most
DECO economies, so VAT refund s would be correspondingly lower
in a U.S. VAT.1 59 Nevertheless. the general magnitude of VAT re ~
fund s relative to collections makes clear the fiscal risk that may be
associated with providing immediate refunds. Although refund fraud
exists in the credit-invoice method VAT, the invoice requirement empirically has provided a reasonably adequate enforcement mechanism.
Under EU rules, Member States generally may not require registered
traders to carry forward excess credits for more than six months
before providing refunds. l 60
Refunds of negative taxable value added may be more controversial
in a sub lra ction ~method VAT, particularly if using the s ubtraction~
method lens brings income tax system assumptions into play. The cor~
porate income tax allows losses to be carried back and carried forward, to claim refunds for tax paid in prior years or to reduce tax
liability in future years. 161 Such business losses are the closest income
tax analog to negative taxable value added. Thus, it is possible that
near-immediate refunds for negative taxable value added would be
limited if the subtraction-method VAT was understood as a business
tax. On the other hand , the Boren-Danforth and Gibbons proposals
did provide for immediate refunds. 162

J . Coordinating Tax Administration. with the Rest of the World
In addition to being border-adjustable, credit-invoice method VATs
may be more likely to be imposed in a manner that avoids double
taxation and double non taxation of cross-border services than subtraction-method VATs. One key issue in designing a VAT for the 21st
century relates to the rules for taxation of cross-border trade in serISS Graham Harrison & Russell Krelove, VAT Refunds: A Review of Country Experie nce 5, 8 (IMF. Working Paper No. OSn18. 2005), available at httpJ/i mf.org.externaVpubs!
ftlwpl2OO5JwpOS218.pdf. Over the fo ur-year period from 1998 to 2001 , VAT refunds in
canada ave raged 50.3% of gross VAT collections. while VAT refunds in the EU averaged
38.1 % of collections. Id. at 8; see Michael Keen & Stephen Smith, VAT Fraud aDd Evasion: What Do We Know, and What Can be Done?, S9 Nat'l Tall. J. 861 (2006).
IS9 Keen & Smith, note 158, at 884.
18) Council Directive 79110721EEC, arl. 7(4), 1979 O.J. (L 331) II . (EC).
161 Net operating losses generally can be carried back for two years or carried forward
for twenty years. IRC § In. Ma ny limitat ions and special rules apply, including rules
limiting or disallowing the carryover of net operating losses when stock ownership in a
corporation shifts in specified ways. IRC §§ 381-384.
162 H.R. 4050, note 34, at § 202; Danforth & Boren, nOle 33 ("Refunds of BAT (e.g.. a
refund may be due because a taxpayer has business purchases for the taxable period in
excess of gross receipts for the period) would be made by tbe Secretary of the Treasury
within 45 days of the taxpayer fil ing a return requesting the refund.").
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vices and intangibles}63 U.S. exports of financial services, insurance
services, education, te lecommunications, and professional and technical services grew at an average rate of 9.9% per year between 1992
and 2005. 164 Cross-border royalty and license fees for intangibles
grew at a rate of 8.1 % over the same period.16 5
The OECD's Committee on Fiscal Affairs is currently developing
VAT/GST guid elines in the area of intemationaUy traded services and
intangibles, with the twin goals of ensuring that taxation aligns as
closely as possible with consumption of these services and intangibles
(that is, value added is taxed on a destination basis) and that international norms develop on a consensus basis so as to avoid both double
taxation and uninte nded nontaxation .l 66 In the income tax area, bilateral tax treaties allocate taxing rights between jurisdictions and include other provisions th at reduce the risk of double taxation . This
bilateral treaty system, however, does not generally extend to the area
of VAT/GST. Thus, if the United States were to adopt a VAT, it
would be important to coordinate our domestic rules for addressing
the application of VAT/GST with those of the most significant recipie nts of services and intangibles supplied from the United States, and
providers of services and intangibles to the United States, in order to
avoid double taxation and non taxation with respect to cross-border
services. 167 Without such coordination, the application of destinationbasis principles can be inconsistent and lead to double taxation or
double non taxation.
The guidelines emerging from the DEeD, however, will be primarily intended to inform the administration of a credit-in voice method
163 See Walter Helierstein & Michael Keen, Interjurisdictionallssues in the Design of a
VAT. 63 Tax L. Rev. 359 (2010).
1M Maria Borga, Improved Measures of U.S. International Services: The Cases of Insurance, Wholesale and Re tail Trade. a nd Financial Services. in International Trade in Services and Intangibles in the Era of Globalization 79 (Marshall Reinsdorf & Matthew
Slaughter eds., 2009).
16.5 Id.
!66 Comm. on Fiscal Affairs, DECO , Applying VATIGST to Cross-Border Trade in Services and Intangibles: Emerging Concepts for Defining Place of Taxation-Invitation for
Comments 4-5 (2008), available at hnp:llwww.oecd.orgldataoecdJ42111139874228.pdf.
161 Centre for Tax Pol'y and Admin., OECD, The Applicatio n of Consumption Taxes to
the Trade in International Services and Intangibles 6 (2004), available at http://www.Qe(:d.
orgidataoecdl56136J32997 184.pdf. There is currentl y no widely available mechanism to settle international do uble consumption tax disputes. Thcre are, however, some refund mechanisms under certain countries' domestic law fo r VAT/GST incurred by foreign business
(or registration procedures in certain countries to achieve the same e Uect), which add ress
some issues of double consumptio n taxation. Jd. al 7. While in principle it would be possible to extend the existing bilateral tax treaty network to cover such taxes, as a practical
matter, such a development seems highl y unlikely. Victor Thuryoni, Inte rnational Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral Treaty, 26 Brook. J. Int' I L. t641 (2001) (proposing a multilate ral treaty system to replace the OECD bilateral model).
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VAT, for the simple reason that most OEeD membe r states have such
a VAT. To be sure, this advice could be adapted to a subtractionmethod VAT, but the relevance of the guidelines may be less apparent, and the likelihood of adopting their recommendations with ease
consequently may be lower. Today. in fact, a lack of continuity between EU and Japanese rules regarding the place of taxation of traded
services and intangibles can lead to significant double taxation and
double nontaxation.l68 Cross-border services and intangibles thus
provide an example of where the advantages of conformity with the
international norm of a credit-invoice VAT makes a credit-invoice
method VAT more attractive than a subtraction-method VAT.
K.

Coordinating the VAT with State Retail Sales Taxes

Domestically, coordinating the VAT with state sales taxes is likely
to pose significant challenges. Federal adoption of a credit-invoice
method VAT as opposed to a subtraction-method VAT may result in
different responses from the states with respect to their existing retail
sales taxes. In another paper for this conference, Charles McLure
suggests that one ideaJ solution for adopting an add-on VAT in the
United States would involve a set of state retail sales taxes that conform to the federal VAT, both with respect to the treatment of supplies to business and with respect to the set of goods and services that
are taxed. 169 McLure suggests that all services taxed unde r the VAT
should also be taxed under state RSTs, and tbat , with caveats not described here, VAT-registered traders could be treated as exempt from
RST as a result of having registered to pay VAT.170 He argues that it
would ease compliance substantially if only the goods and services
benefiting from exemptions and zero-rating under the federal VAT
were exempt under state RSTs.171 No less importantly, he notes that
to make compliance manageable, any goods and services benefiting
168 Richard Thompson Ainsworth, Taxing Services Under the EU VAT and Japanese
Consumption Tax: A Comparati ve Assessment of New EU Place of Taxation Rules fo r
Services and Intangibles 28-33 (Bosto n Univ. Sch . of Law, Working Paper No. 06-30,
2006), available at hllp:I!www.bu.eduJIaw/faculty/sc ho larshiplworki ngpapersldocumentsl
AinswonhR091206.pdf.
WI McLure, note 58. McLure recommends that the states adopt a "zero-rale VIVAT"
(which is equivale nt to comprehensive reverse charging) that can be seen as an ideal form
of RST that could be easily coordinated with the fede ral VAT. Id. at 673.
170 Td. at 681.
J1l ld. at 704. McLUre notes that in addition 10 the lack of uniformity of tax bases, the
absence of uniform administrative procedures across states and the lack of ad ministrative
cooperatio n among states a re the chief causes of complexity of the sales tax system as it is
experie nced by businesses operating in more tban one stale. Charles E. McLure, Jr., Coordinating Slate Sales Taxes with a Federal VAT: Opportunities, Risks, and Challenges, 117
St. Tax Today 2 (June 20, 2005).
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from exemption or zero-rating should be defined in a standard way for
both VAT and RST purposes.l 72
Whether this ideal level of coordination between federal and state
tax administrations is given consideration could be affected by the nature of the VAT adopted at the federal level. In the open subtractionmethod VAT, there is no VAT registration of the type on which
McLure hopes to rely, and thus no prospect for conformity with respect to the treatment of sales of intermediate inputs to other businesses. More generally, advocates of a subtraction-method VAT
believe that one reason to adopt such a tax is that, unlike the creditinvoice method VAT, it is a "business tax " and not a "transactionsbased" tax, and therefore does not intrude on a space (transactionsbased consumption taxes) historically occupied by state and local government. 173 This perception may be a political advantage of the subtraction-method VAT. Migration towards a uniform VAT/RST base,
however, seems significantly less likely if the federal government
adopts any form of subtraction-method VAT, precisely because such a
tax has little outward resemblance to retail sales taxes, and therefore
the question of base conformity is unlikely to arise. As McLure notes,
although it would be a challenge to convince the states to conform to a
federal VAT base, any reasonably broad VAT base would be a significant improvement for most state sales taxes.l7 4 Analysts generally
agree that if such a base were adopted on a revenue-neutral basis by
state RSTs, it would be of benefit to the states and taxpayers alike.l15
L.

The Political Economy of Adoption and Amendment

Advocates of subtraction-method VATs claim that a political and
practical advantage of the subtraction method of calculation is its relative familiarity.l7 6 At first glance, the major differences between an
172 McLure, note 58, at 704.
173 Alan Schenk, Choosing the Form of a Federal VAT, 22 Cap. u. L. Rev 291, 309
(199]) (noting that opposition to a Cederal credit-invoice method VAT may intensify because state governments view it as an intrusion into the field of sales tax, whereas slates
may no t raise a serious objection to a federal subtraction-method VAT because it is "buried in the sales price of taxable goods and services because buyers do nOf see the fax on
every taxable purchase. ").
174 McLure, nOle 171 , at 919; Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Nuttiness of State and Local
Taxes and the Nuttiness of Responses Thereto, 2S SI. Tax Notes 841 (Sept. 16,2(02) (hereinafter Nuttiness].
m McLure, Nuttiness, note 174, at 844-48 (describing the ideal, economically neutral
sales tax base); John L Mikesell, Sales Tax Incentives for Economic Development: Why
Shouldn 't Production Exemptions Be General?, 54 Nat'l Tax. J. 557 (2001); Graetz, note
18, at 189-91 (suggesting that coordination between state and federal consumption tax bases would have great economic benefits).
116 Hufbauer & Grieco, nole 20, at 70-71 (listing four such considerations making subtraction method superior to credit method); see also Tax Reform Panel Report, note II , at
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open subtraction·method consumption tax and a corporate income tax
are expensing and the loss of interest deductions. These are major
divergences from the corporate income tax, but for legislative purposes these changes may seem small relative to the perceived seachange of imposing a federal tax at the cash register.
One potential consequence of the claim that a subtraction-me thod
VAT is a "business tax" rather than a transactional tax imposed on
sales to consumers could be that the rules governing an add-on subtraction-method VAT and a corporate income tax may come to be
seen as fungible, and the two taxes may be allowed to blur and interact in unexpected ways. For example, businesses that have negative
income but continue to have positive VAT liability (because sales exceed nonlabor input costs) might lobby to amend or re peal a subtraction-method VAT. Positive VAT liability for the auto industry at a
time it was experiencing significant losses led to th e repeal of Michi gan 's Single Business Tax , a state-level, value-added tax that was
structured as an accounts-based, entity-level tax .D 7 Alte rnately, some
analysts suggest that the VAT might be vulnerable to a political compromise that allows capital investments to be expensed (as in a VAT)
while providing deductions for interest expense (as in the corporate
income tax), resulting in negative marginal effective tax rates.l7s Or,
to raise revenue, expensing might be repea led and replaced with a
depreciation system, as effectively happened over time with the Mich163 (the proposed plan "would be implemented using the subtraction method because it is
closer to current law methods of accouDting, which would reduce the cOSts of switching tax
syste ms"). That claim is somewhat overstated, since every multina tional corporation
should have experience with the credit-invoice method VAT in its operations outside the
United States. Nevertheless, most U.S. businesses a re not multinationals.
In Dave Turzewski & Mike Deal, The Impact of the New Michigan Business Tax on the
Au to Industry, 50 51. Tax Notes 145 (Dec. 15,2(08). Michigan's Single Business Tax (SBT)
was a state-level "addition-method " modified value-added tax. Sec generally Ho use Fiscal
Agency, House of Representatives, State of Michigan, Background and History: Michigan's Single Business Tax (2003). The SST was perceived as a business-level tax since the
accou nts-based formula for calcu la ting liability relied on deductions and addi tions to a
"business income" concepl. See id. a t 13-14 (discussing the role of "business income" in
the tax base). The SBT was in place from 1975 until its repeal, effective December 31,
2001. See Mich. Compo Laws § 208.1101(1) (repealing the single business tax). It had been
amended various times, and the Michigan legislature added various deductions, exemptions. and credits that moved the tax away from a theoretically pure consumption ta x base.
$ce, e.g.. Mich. Camp. Laws § 208.35a (the repealed investmentta" credit). The SBT "was
ultima tely viewed as a burdensome tax on businesses that had large payroll expenses and
significant capital investment." Turzewski & Deal, supra, a t 145.
118 Ronald A. Pearlman, A Tax Reform Caveat: In the Real World, There Is No Perfect
Tax System, in Toward Fundamental Tax Refonn 119 (Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A. Hassell cds., 2005) (expressing the author's fear of an "inevitable" political compromise like
"enactment of e nha nced tax-sheltered savings incentives or expensing of capilal investments without any further limitations on the deductibility of inte rest expense").

2010]

WHERE CREDIT IS DUE

355

igan Single Business Tax.l19 Even if initially adopted In a relatively
"clean" form , the very familiarity of the subtraction-method VAT
would seem to leave it vulnerable to adornment with various features
familiar from the current corporate income tax} 80 The credit-invoice
method VAT would certainly be subject to its own political pressures ,
with regard to prefe rential rates, exemptions, zero-rating, and the like.
However, the corporate income tax lens would not seem to have salience in debates over a credit-invoice method VAT. Meanwhile, the
basic integrity of the credit-invoice method VAT is retained even in
the face of some exemptions and zero-eating.l S I
IV.

AN ALTERNATJVE FRAMEWORK PREMISED ON
INFORMATION COLLECTION

As alluded to early in this Article, Weisbach has elegantly demonstrated that purported substantive differences between the s ubtraction -method VAT and the credit-invoice method VAT are not
inherent to the two methods of calculation.lS2 Weisbach points out
that with the same information collection and other parallel design
decisions, a subtraction -method VAT could, in principle, be fa shioned
to produce identical results to a credit-invoice method VAT.tS3 He
argues that the differences, such as the ability to deq.uct the cost of
inputs purchased from nontaxpayers or the flexibility to impose preferential tax rates on specific goods or se rvices, are based on the
amo unt of information that analysts assume will be collected in a
credit-invoice method VAT and a subtraction-method VAT respectively.l84 In his words, "a nything that can be achieved through a
credit system can be achieved through a deduction system with the
right information." 18S
The virtue of Weisbach's analytical framework, which differentiates
between open and closed VAT systems, is that it emphasizes the distinction be tween the information gathered in a credit-invoice or subtraction method system, the design decisions made in implementing
179 Thrzewski & Deal, nOle 177.
180 See, e.g., J. CliflOn Aeming, Jr., Scoping Out the Uncenain Simplificatio n (Complicat ion?) Effects of VATs, BATs, and Consumed Income Taxes, 2 Aa. Tax Rev. 390,4 10-11
(1995) (listing ten "complex lax incentive provisions presently found in the income tax"
that would likely "adom" a BAT); Pearlman. note 178, at 119.
lSI Graetz, note 18, at 82 ("the best alternative (of consumption lax] is the credit·invoice
VAT").
182 Weisbach, nOle 15, at 214-15 (showing how " (g]ive n the information provided in a
credit-invoice VAT. a subtraction method VAT could be made identical").
183 Id. at 2 15.
1&4 Id.
185 Id. at 219.
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that system, and the mechanics of calculating tax liability. If one takes
the only difference between a credit-invoice method VAT and a subtraction-method VAT to be that one uses credits and the other uses
deductions , then it should be possible to mathematically convert between the two systems_
Weisbach illustrated that the credit-invoice method of calculation
and the subtraction method of calculation can be used to produce the
same policy result as part of an argument that a progressive two-tier
consumption tax could be a workable tax reform proposal, which
would combine the subtraction method of calculation with the invoice
features and certain other design elements of a credit-invoice method
VATYl6 This unique combination of features was in fact largely
adopted by the 2005 Tax Reform Panel. ]87
But unless the goal is a progressive consumption tax , or implementing some other substantive deviation from standard credit-invoice
method VAT design , there is no clear impetus for combining a subtraction-method of calculation with the invoice requirement and other
standard design features of the credit-invoice method VAT. Particularly in the presence of multiple rates, such a system results in tax
calculations that are less intuitive than the credit-invoice method, and
cannot be described as simpler to calculate, or more familiar to U.s.
businesses than the credit-invoice mechanism.
A recent proposal from Gary Hufbauer and Paul Grieco to adopt a
subtraction-method VAT with information collection features similar
to an invoice requirement illustrates that the rationale for using a subtraction-method VAT tends to be to maintain an entity-based approach that justifies deviations from typical VAT design. ]SS Unlike
most subtraction-method VAT proposals for the United States, Hufbauer and Grieco propose a sophisticated subtraction-method VAT.I 89
However, while Hufbauer and Grieco would limit the availability of
deductions to purchases from registered taxpayers, they would then
(jrnit the application of their subtraction-method VAT to corporations
currently subject to the corporate income tax , and exempt all other
businesses. ]90 As discussed above, businesses that make exempt supplies have an incentive to avoid paying VAT.191 The widespread exemption for flow-through businesses across all sectors of the U.S.
economy entailed by Hufbauer and Grieco's proposal therefore undermines the self-policing nature of the VAT.
186 See id.

187 TaX" Reform Panel Report , nOle 11, at 163.
188 Hufbauer & Grieco, nole 20; see text accompanying nOles 32, 69.
189 Hufbaue r & Grieco, note 20, at 70-74.
19(1

Id.

191

See Section

III.B.
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CONCLUSION

Credit-invoice method VATs and subtraction-method VATs are, at
a conceptual level, very similar taxes. The subtraction method aggregates all taxable receipts into an account, subtracts deductible expenses, and then multiplies by a tax rate. In contrast, the creditinvoice method starts with taxable amounts imposed on individual
transactions, but businesses must ultimately aggregate transactions
into accounts to file returns. Nevertheless, as a result of the different
starling points, the subtraction-method VAT is perceived to be a tax
on an entity, while the credit-invoice method VAT is perceived to be a
tax on specific goods and services. The most important substantive
difference between the credit-invoice method VAT and the subtraction-method VAT lies in the invoice requirement. The invoice requirement performs two basic functions: It limits the ability of a
registered trader to reduce its VAT burden by an offset for the cost of
its business inputs to an offset for business inputs purchased from
other registered traders, and it ensures that offset is exactly equal to
the amount of VAT paid. By ensuring symmetry between deductions
and inclusions, the invoice requirement substantially reduces tax
avoidance opportunities in the VAT. The invoice requirement also
allows exemptions and zero-rating to work properly and makes WTOcompliant border adjustments possible. Together, these features are
essential if the VAT is to be an efficient tool for revenue collection
while remaining consistent with the United States' international trade
obligations.
Subtraction-method VATs can be divided into open subtractionmethod VATs and sophisticated subtraction-method VATs. Subtraction-method VAT proposals introduced in the U.S. Congress generally
have been open domestically. Open subtraction-method VATs are
flawed. They are vulnerable to tax avoidance , invite widespread lobbying for exemptions, and probably cannot be administered on a destination basis and remain WTO-compliant. A sophisticated
subtraction-method VAT imposed at a single nonzero rate could address these issues by limiting deductions to inputs purchased from registered taxpayers. In this case, the credit-invoice method VAT and the
subtraction-method VAT could produce identical results. To do so,
however, the sophisticated subtraction-method VAT must abandon
the calculation of VAT liability based on simpler summary accounts,
which is a primary reason cited by subtraction-method VAT advocates
for preferring the subtraction method.
Furthermore, the perceived difference between the subtractionmethod VAT, as an "accounts-based" tax on an entity, and the creditinvoice method VAT, as a "transactions-based" tax on specific goods
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and services, could affect policy outcomes. For instance, the "entity
tax" characterization of a subtraction-method VAT may make it less
likely to be imposed at multiple rates. Multiple rates are generally
undesirable. A subtraction-method VAT, however, may also be more
likely to be enacted with less desirable entity-based exemptions, including for nonprofit and governmental entities, or even for all passthrough entities, and with broad rather than narrowly tailored exemptions in areas such as residential housing and financial services. Appropriate treatment of these sectors is an important part of designing
a VAT, as together they represent a substantial part of economic activity. Further, as an entity-based tax, even a sophisticated subtraction-method VAT may be vulnerable to WTO challenge if imposed on
a destination basis. Avoiding double taxation and non taxation in the
area of cross-border services through international cooperation may
also be more likely in a credit-invoice method VAT than in a subtraction-method VAT. Similarly, the potential for coordination with state
sales taxes may be higher under a credit-invoice method VAT. Finally, a credit-invoice method VAT alongside the corporate income
tax seems less vulnerable to amendment to include features of the corporate income tax than a subtraction-method VAT. Credit-invoice
method VATs thus seem, on balance, more likely than subtractionmethod VATs to be adopted with VAT design best practices. This is
perhaps unsurprising, as those practices were developed based on fifty
years of worldwide experience with credit-invoice method VATs. As
one author at this conference has written previously, if a VAT were to
be adopted to supplement or partially replace the income tax, it is not
clear why it would be desirable to try to "reinvent the wheel."l92
1':12 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Comment on Shay and Summers: Selected International Aspects of Fundamental Tax Reform Proposals, 51 U. Miami. L Rev. 1085, 1086 (1997).

